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This Note examines the emergence of consumer-directed information
disclosure proposals in the health care reform debate. By drawing on the
literatures of cognitive psychology, marketing, and existing statutory
information disclosure, the author discusses the drawbacks of relying on health
care report cards as a quality assurance system. The author concludes that
report cards cannot currently assure quality, given limitations in the state of
the art of quality measurement and an inadequate understanding of how
consumers would process disclosed information.
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Introduction
After months of intense research by Hillary Rodham Clinton's semi-secret
Task Force and political maneuvering by the White House, President Bill
Clinton announced his plan to reform the nation's health care system on
Wednesday evening, September 22, 1993. In a televised address to the joint
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Houses of Congress, he proclaimed "a new chapter in the American story."'
The President staked his plan on six "fixed stars": security, simplicity,
savings, choice, quality, and responsibility. In describing the fifth star, quality,
Clinton proposed to harness the opportunities of the information age and create
report cards on health plans so that consumers could compare competing plans
and reward high quality providers by selecting their plans.2
The report card proposal has been more resilient than the Clinton Plan
itself. The proposal's inclusion in subsequent reform agendas and its place at
center stage in state level and private quality assurance programs demonstrate
the powerful appeal report cards now have in health care delivery. Although
the President and Congress eventually disagreed on the plot and ending of
Clinton's "new chapter," the health care reform debate in the 103rd Congress
set the stage for a major movement in health care quality assurance. While
Congress continues to consider reform bills that include report card systems,
states and the private sector have already adopted consumer-directed quality
information disclosure as the mantra of modern quality assurance.
This Note evaluates health care report cards. Part I examines Title V of
Clinton's Health Security Act and subsequent reform bills to determine what
substance, if any, the proposed legislation gives to the report card and what
role different institutions in the health care system would play in its
development. This Section reveals that policymakers describe the concept of
a consumer-directed information disclosure program, but not its substance. Part
II describes the state of the art in health care quality measurement and current
efforts to promote quality and control costs through consumer education. This
discussion demonstrates that the limited science and prohibitive cost of quality
measurement undermine the efficacy of a national report card proposal. Part
III reviews literature on cognitive psychology, marketing, and the laws
requiring information disclosure in order to develop an understanding of
consumer information processing in health care and other regulatory contexts.
This section explores in detail two existing efforts to improve quality, empower
consumers, and modify consumer and industry behavior through information
strategies: nutrition labeling under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
(NLEA)3 and credit cost term disclosure under the Truth In Lending Act
(TILA)4 and the Truth In Lending Simplification and Reform Act (TILSRA).5
1. Adam Clymer, Clinton's Health Plan: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at Al.
2. Clinton's Health Plan: Transcript of President's Address to Congress on Health Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A24.
3. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 and in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (1993)). 21 U.S.C. § 301 gives the
legislative genealogy and short title for the NLEA.
4. Truth In Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 101, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1601 (1968)) (enacted as Title I of Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82
Stat. 146 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1968))).
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Ultimately, the uncertainty of consumer response to information disclosure
suggests that report cards are not an appropriate quality assurance mechanism.
I. Competition, Consumer Satisfaction, and Quality Control in Health Care
Reform Legislation: The Report Card
Six weeks after President Clinton first announced his intention to overhaul
the health care system, the Clinton Administration ceremoniously relaunched
its plan with the public release of the 1,342 page bill on October 27, 1993.6
On Saturday evening, November 20, the bill was formally presented to the
House and Senate with considerably less fanfare, signalling the beginning of
a grueling legislative battle. Former House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt
introduced the Health Security Act (HSA) as H.R. 3600 with ninety-nine
cosponsors, and Former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell did likewise
for S. 1757 along with thirty fellow senators. 7
The subsequent rise and fall of health care reform in the 103rd Congress
is a well known story. For the purposes of this discussion, it need only be
noted that after its celebrated introduction, the Clinton bill rapidly lost
momentum, and several important competing plans emerged in Congress.
Legislators failed to reach consensus on any of these proposals, and by
September 26, 1994, Senator Mitchell declared health care reform dead for
the year. The Administration and influential members of Congress quickly
vowed to reintroduce new legislation in the 104th Congress. The demise of
the Clinton plan does not diminish the importance of assessing report card
proposals. As even a brief survey of major alternative plans reveals, report
cards are part of the reform agenda. Whatever national reform ultimately
emerges will almost certainly, and uncritically, sanction and expand report card
use. Moreover, state governments and regulatory agencies at all levels have
anticipated Congress. Report card programs are already centerpieces of state-
level health reform and regulatory experimentation. Finally, the private sector
has enthusiastically seized on report cards' promise of increased price
competition, quality monitoring, and consumer empowerment. In their rush
to develop report cards, accreditation agencies, health plans, and major
5. Truth In Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1993)).
6. Timothy J. McNulty, The Clintons' 1,342-Page Prescription, CHI. TRM., Oct. 28, 1993, at
NI.
7. The Health Security Act appears as H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), and as S. 1757,
103d Cong., I st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter cited to original sections of the Health Security Act]. See also
139 CONo. REc. E2989 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1993) (extension of remarks by Rep. Gephardt, introducing
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corporations have created, virtually overnight, a vast information-processing
and distribution industry in health care.
A. The Clinton Plan
Careful analysis of the original Clinton bill provides not only a blueprint
of a prototypical report card system, but also a greater understanding of the
goals that policymakers expect to achieve through report cards. Consumer-
directed information disclosure played a central role in the Clinton
Administration's efforts to create a quality improvement program and control
costs; informed, comparison-shopping consumers were expected to spur price
and quality competition among plans. Among the six explicitly enumerated
purposes of the HSA, four related directly to the quality reporting system: "to
simplify the health care system for consumers," "to control the cost of health
care," "to promote individual choice among health plans and health care
providers," and "to ensure high quality health care."8
Title V of the HSA addressed quality and consumer protection. Sections
5001 and 5002 created a National Quality Management Program under the
seven member National Health Board. A fifteen member National Quality
Management Council would have administered the program. 9 Both National
Health Board and National Quality Management Council members were to be
appointed directly by the President, National Health Board members being
selected on the basis of their experience and expertise in the fields of medicine,
health care financing and delivery, state health systems, consumer protection,
business, law, and delivery of care to vulnerable populations."0 National
Quality Management Council members would have included representatives
from corporate purchasers of health care; health plans; the States; health care
providers; academic health centers; and experts in public health, health care
quality, and health services research. 1
Although the HSA established an elaborate administrative structure to
support the National Quality Management Program, it gave the National Health
Board almost no guidance as to the content of the program itself. The statute
required that the National Quality Management Program be "designed to
enhance the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of health care services
and access to such services."2 To that end, section 5003 instructed the
National Quality Management Council to develop a "set of national measures
of quality performance, which shall be used to assess the provision of health
8. Health Security Act, supra note 7, § 3.
9. Id. §§ 5001-5002. Health Security Act § 1501 creates the National Health Board.
10. Id. § 1502.
11. Id. § 5002.
12. Id. § 5001.
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care services and access to such services." In consultation with the states;
health plans; empldyers; individual consumers; providers; the newly formed
National Quality Consortium; experts in law, medicine, economics, public
health, and health services research; the administrator for Health Care Policy
and Research; the Director of the National Institute of Health; and the
Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration, the Council was
instructed to select measures providing information on six subjects: access to
health care services, appropriateness of services provided, outcomes of health
care services and procedures, health promotion, prevention of diseases, and
consumer satisfaction. Measures of quality performance were to be selected
on the basis of significance, reliability and validity, variation among providers,
linkage to health outcomes under provider control, and relation to public health
goals. In addition, section 5003 stipulated that the set of measures chosen was
to be representative of the range of services provided to consumers of health
care and based on data "obtain[able] without undue burden on the entity or
individual providing the data." The Council was instructed to update the
national quality-performance measures annually. 3 In areas where sufficient
information and consensus were found to exist, the National Quality
Management Council was instructed to recommend that the National Health
Board establish performance goals for health plans and providers.4
Consumer surveys played an important role in the HSA's information
gathering efforts. Section 5004 instructed the National Quality Management
Council to conduct periodic surveys of consumers to gather data on access,
use of services, health outcomes, and patient satisfaction. The surveys were
to be standardized and administered by the Administrator of the federal Agency
for Health Care Policy and Research on a plan-by-plan basis."
The HSA created additional bureaucratic players in the quality
improvement program: Regional Professional Foundations, alliances, and a
National Quality Consortium. The National Health Board was to appoint eleven
members to the Consortium, five representing academic health centers and the
other six representing schools of public health, medical schools, nursing
schools, and allied health professional schools.1 6 In addition to advising the
National Quality Management Council on the selection of national quality
measures, the Consortium was to oversee the establishment of the Regional
Professional Foundations. The latter were then to develop "innovative patient
education systems that enhance patient involvement in decisions relating [to]
their health care."'" The alliances were to "disseminate to consumers
13. Id. § 5003.
14. Id. § 5005.
15. Id. § 5004.
16. Id. § 5009.
17. Id. § 5008.
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information relating to quality and access to aid in their selection of plans" and
conduct educational programs to "assist consumers in using quality and other
information in choosing health plans." 8
Under section 5013, the legal and financial burden of measuring and
producing the data required by the new federal bureaucracy, the states, and
the individual alliances would have fallen on individual health plans. These
plans would have been required to maintain quality management systems that
used the national measures of quality performance and "measure[d] the quality
of health care furnished to enrollees under the plan by all health care providers
who are members of a provider network of the plan."19
To facilitate data collection, the HSA proposed the creation of a massive
data bank and electronic health information system within two years of the
Health Security Act's passage.2" This unprecedented national health
information system would have combined cost, enrollment, demographic,
utilization review, quality, grievance, and financial data with any other type
of information deemed appropriate by the National Health Board. This effort
would have dwarfed the only other national data bank in the health care sector,
the often criticized National Practitioner Databank, created in 1986 by the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act.2
Once this extensive array of individual, institutional, and bureaucratic
actors had defined national quality measures and collected relevant data, a
Herculean feat in itself, there would have remained the more significant task
of using that data to promote quality care, provider and consumer education,
and cost control.22 Public education under the HSA would have proceeded
at two levels: decisions by consumers, and decisions by patients. The first
level, termed here the "point of insurance" choice, would have involved
educating consumers about the options faced when selecting a health plan each
year. An individual consumer at this level might or might not have been a
patient, that is, a party already involved with the health care system on a
18. Id. § 5012.
19. Id. § 5013.
20. Id. §§ 5101-5106.
21. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52 (Supp. 1993). See
Susan L. Homer, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History, Provisions,
Applications and Implications, 16 Am. J.L. & MED. 455 (1990); Elisabeth Ryzen, The National
Practitioner Databank: Problems and Proposed Reforms, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 409 (1992) (arguing that
the data bank gathers erroneous and marginally relevant information, inadequately safeguards
confidentiality, and costs more than its benefits justify; also recommending that amendments expanding
its scope should be repealed, that only extremes of malpractice payments in number and amount should
be reported to strengthen the link of incompetence to settlements and awards, that reporting criteria for
resident physicians should be restricted, and that the data bank should be purged every five years).
22. This Note focuses only on the quantity, type, and content of the information directed toward
health care consumers and on how consumers process and act upon that information. Similar issues and
questions could be raised for providers, health care institutions such as hospitals or nursing
homes, academic health centers, and health plans.
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regular basis due to an ongoing illness or condition. The second level, termed
the "point of treatment" choice, would have involved educating patients about
particular diseases, conditions, and treatment options that they might encounter
at specific times in their medical histories.
There would have been two principal outlets for all the information
collected by the National Health Board and National Quality Management
Council: performance reports, or report cards,' and practice guidelines.'
Performance reports would have addressed annual point of insurance choices.
Practice guidelines, directed toward consumers as well as providers, would
have addressed the point of treatment choices.' While the creation,
dissemination, and application of practice guidelines were fundamental to the
Quality Program and deserve thorough consideration, this Note focuses only
on report cards.2"
The report card proposal derived from two separate sections of the HSA.
Section 5005(c) outlined the annual performance reports. Alliances would:
publish and make available to the public a performance report
outlining in a standard format the performance of each health plan
offered in the alliance on the set of national measures of quality
performance. The report shall include the results of smaller numbers
of such measures for health care providers who are members of
provider networks of such plans . . . if the available information is
statistically meaningful. The report also shall include the results of
consumer surveys . . . that were conducted in the alliance during the
year that is the subject of the report.
23. HSA, supra note 7, §§ 1325, 5005, 5012.
24. Id. § 5006.
25. Practice guidelines for a number of medical conditions are available from the Department
of Health and Human Services' Agency for Health Care Policy Research (AHCPR). Simplified versions
are published for patients, while detailed guidelines are provided to physicians. See AGENCY FOR
HEALTH CARE POLICY RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PRACTICE GUIDELINE
No. 8, BENIGN PROSTATIC HYPERPLASIA: DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT (1994); AGENCY FOR HEALTH
CARE POLICY RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRACTICE GUIDELINE No. 8,
TREATING YOUR ENLARGED PROSTATE: CONSUMER VERSION (1994).
26. For an enlightening piece on how providers make decisions based on available probabilistic
information, see David M. Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: Problems and
Opportunities, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 249 (Daniel Kamneman
et al. eds., 1982). See also David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty,
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 74; Barry R. Furrow, The Changing Role of the Law in Promoting
Quality in Health Care: From Sanctioning Outlaws to Managing Outcomes, 26 Hous. L. REv. 147, 164-
66 (1989).
The same quality measurement data that produces practice guidelines could also generate plan-wide
information. Current outcomes research, for example, can uncover wide local variation in procedure
use that might lead to the formulation of a practice guideline. Once the guidelines are in place,
compliance could become useful as a plan quality indicator, if it is risk adjusted. See JoAnne Alter &
David Holzman, Interest in Outcomes Research Is Growing Rapidly, in Special Report, Putting Outcomes
Research to Work, BUS. & HEALTH, 8 (Joseph Bums ed., 1992) [hereinafter Special Report].
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The National Quality Management Council was to compile these reports and
consumer surveys into an annual report to Congress on plan performance and
quality trends.27
Section 1325, entitled Consumer Information and Marketing, set minimum
content standards for the report card. Alliances were to make available
"information, in an easily understood and useful form, that allows such
enrollees . . . to make valid comparisons among health plans offered by the
alliance." This was to be published in an annual brochure that would have
presented, in a standardized format, information required by the National
Health Board, including, at a minimum, the following:
(A)The cost of the plan, including premiums and average out-of-
pocket expenses.
(B)The characteristics and availability of health care professionals
and institutions participating in the plan.
(C)Any restrictions on access to providers and services under the
plan.
(D)A summary of the annual quality performance report ... which
contains measures of quality presented in a standard format.2"
B. The Congressional Health Care Reform Bills
All major reform bills introduced as alternatives to the Clinton plan relied
on consumer-directed report cards as a major component of quality assurance.
In this respect, Senator George Mitchell's bill, introduced in August 1994, was
virtually identical to Clinton's proposal.29 The bill's Title V would have
created a National Quality Council,3" numerous Quality Improvement
Foundations, 3' and a National Center of Consumer Information and
Advocacy." The National Quality Council would have established
performance measures and goals33 to be used in grading health plans for
consumer report cards. The data gathering, analysis, and compilation functions
at the heart of the report card system could then have been subcontracted
through competitive bidding,34 and the Consumer Information and Advocacy
27. HSA, supra note 7, § 5005.
28. Id. § 1325.
29. S. 2357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Mitchell Plan]. Senator Mitchell's bill was
also known as the Health Security Act.
30. Id. § 5001.
31. Id. § 5008.
32. Id. § 5009.
33. Id. §§ 5002-5003.
34. Id. §§ 5001(o), 5004(b), 5008(b) (establishing a subcontracting option for the creation of the
Quality Improvement Foundations).
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Centers would have distributed the finished product in each state. The Mitchell
Plan's initial price tag for the National Quality Council, Quality Improvement
Foundations, and Consumer Information and Advocacy Centers was more than
$2.4 billion over six years; all but $24 million of that amount would have been
available to subcontractors.35 Another major reform proposal, introduced late
in the debate by a bipartisan group of moderate Senators as an amendment to
the Mitchell Plan, would have left Title V and the report card proposal
intact. 36
Report card systems have been endorsed by both parties. Republican
Senator John Chafee's plan, while eschewing some of the bureaucracy
proposed in other plans, would have required state programs to prepare price,
outcomes, satisfaction, and quality data for consumers.3 7 Former Senate
Minority Leader Bob Dole's plan would have required each state to develop
a consumer value program that would issue a report card according to
guidelines established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. States
could have subcontracted the administration of these consumer value programs
to private entities.
3 8
Although Congress did not pass any of these specific bills, the reliance
on report card systems as pillars of market reform and quality assurance now
extends across the political spectrum. Even with both Clinton and Congress
stung by the divisiveness of the health care debate, it is virtually certain that
this small patch of common ground will remain when either the Administration
or Congress eventually reintroduces health care reform legislation.
C. Other Government Actors and the Private Sector
Government agencies and the private sector are not waiting for Congress
to enact comprehensive health care reform. Even if Congress never passes
health care reform legislation, the report card movement will become a fixture
of health care cost control and quality assurance efforts. A number of different
actors are forging ahead with report card systems intended to inform
consumers about quality and price.
35. Id. § 5010. The appropriations breakdown for 1995-2000 was to be as follows: $24 million
for the National Quality Council, $1.2 billion for the Quality Improvement Foundations, and $1.2 billion
for the Consumer Information and Advocacy Centers.
36. The so-called Mainstream Coalition plan, introduced by Senators Chafee and Breaux focused
primarily on changes in finance and coverage.
37. S. 1770, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1405 (1994) [hereinafter Chafee Plan].
38. S. 2374, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 21012, 21102-03 (1994) [hereinafter Dole Plan]. Section
21102 mentions that the Secretary should consult with the National Committee for Quality Assurance,
see infra text accompanying note 42, Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations,
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At the federal level, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
(AHCPR), located in the Department of Public Health, announced in
September 1994 that it would develop a national report card on managed care
providers that would combine the results of consumer surveys, medical records
reviews, and analysis of insurance claims data.39 In addition, a number of
state governments have already passed laws requiring the creation and
dissemination of hospital report cards.'
Private sector efforts are advancing even more rapidly. The Joint
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) is
attempting to become a major player in the report card scramble. In the fall
of 1994, JCAHO launched an intensive state-level lobbying effort to encourage
health departments and reform commissions to adopt its clinical-indicator
monitoring and public quality data disclosure systems. In California, Florida,
and Washington, JCAHO has lobbied state authorities to mandate use of its
systems to satisfy new health care data reporting laws. 41 In addition, JCAHO
has created a new vice-presidency for government relations to oversee the
lobbying effort.
The private National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA),
originally dedicated solely to accrediting Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs), is bidding to become the ultimate arbiter of quality data gathering,
analysis, and distribution. NCQA is currently engaged in a report card pilot
program with twenty major health plans and intends to release its first set of
report cards rating hospitals by the end of 1994.42 The Committee is also
combining performance measures and consumer satisfaction surveys in a report
card project involving Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, the United Auto
Workers, and nine Michigan HMOs. 4
3
Corporations have invested heavily in report card systems. Long
concerned about the cost and quality of health benefits offered to employees,
large corporations have begun to forge partnerships with managed care plans
to create their own report card systems. The New England Group, which
includes sixteen health plans and twenty-eight employers and is led by
39. Jonathan Gardner, Federal Agency Set to Grade Providers, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Sept.
19, 1994, at 3.
40. See infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
41. David Burda, JCAHO Seeks Inclusion in State Reform Legislation, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
Sept. 12, 1994, at 17, 17-19.
42. Participating HMOs will each have paid $100,000 for their involvement in the project. Paul
J. Kenkel, New England HMOs, Employers, Proceed with "Report Card, 'MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr.
11, 1994, at 18.
43. Consumer Protection and Quality Assurance Under Health Care Reform, 1994: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Health for Families and the Uninsured of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (forthcoming 1994) (statement of Margaret O'Kane, President, National Committee for
Quality Assurance); Louise Kertesz, Kaiser Releases HEDIS Information, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July
11, 1994, at 6.
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Massachusetts-based Digital Equipment Corporation and the Harvard
Community Health Plan, is working with NCQA to establish such a system.'
In an independent project that has discouraged proponents of a nationally
uniform data system, Cigna HealthCare will pay Minnesota-based United
HealthCare Corporation, which covers approximately twenty-three million
beneficiaries in managed care plans in twenty cities, approximately three
million dollars in 1994 and 1995 to produce its own report cards.45
Xerox has emerged as a leader in the corporate report card sector. Its
benefits management system, dubbed HealthLink, may become a blueprint for
a privatized report card industry that would fill the void left by stalled federal
legislation. Rather than commit all of its 170,000 geographically disparate
employees to a single managed care plan, Xerox has contracted plan oversight
to six regional "network managers," who administer numerous local managed
care plans eager to enroll Xerox employees. These network managers tend to
be large corporations already active in the managed care arena: US Healthcare;
Prudential Insurance; Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rochester, New York;
Kaiser Permanente; and the HMO Group. As part of their administrative
duties, network managers collect and distribute report card data from numerous
local managed care plans. Eligible plans must provide standardized quality and
satisfaction data to network managers. Xerox distributes these report cards to
employees and then, in a strategy known as benchmarking, offers them
financial incentives to choose the least costly plans. As a result, Xerox has had
significant success in controlling its health care expenditures.' However, it
remains to be seen whether cost or satisfaction data guide employees' choices
significantly more than quality data, or even whether quality data influence
such choices at all.
D. Growth of the Report Card Industry: De Jure or De Facto Reform
The information disclosure programs endorsed by the HSA and its various
legislative descendants described the concept of a consumer-directed and
information-based quality and cost control program. For the substance of such
a program, consumers must await the results of work carried out by some
combination of National Health Boards, National Quality Management
Councils, Regional Professional Associations or Quality Improvement
Foundations, Alliances, state governments, and private organizations. This
44. Kenkel, supra note 42, at 18.
45. Paul J. Kenkel, United HealthCare, Cigna Mavericks on Report Cards, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Apr. 4, 1994, at 44, 44.
46. For fifty-five liMOs contracting with one of Xerox's six network managers, the premium
increase for 1994 was only 1.1 %, well below the industry average. Christine Woolsey, Employers May
Copy Xerox Plan for HMOs, Bus. INS., June 20, 1994, at 1, 1, 16.
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work has already begun in earnest. Corporate benefits managers and
independent network managers with corporate clients are now set to implement
report card systems, whether or not Congress succeeds in passing a reform
bill that legislates federal or state responsibility for the ultimate administration
of information disclosure.
The private sector's financial incentives to develop effective report card
systems are immense. The Mitchell Plan proposed a $2.4 billion budget for
the National Quality Council, Quality Assurance Foundations, and Consumer
Advocacy Centers; much of this sum would have been used for subcontracting.
The proliferation of state, corporate, and federally-funded efforts to produce
report cards has created a new billion-dollar industry in health care information
processing and distribution. Corporations and managed care plans, as direct
providers of health care services or as network managers, may soon control
the flow of health care information and thus billions of dollars in health care
benefits. The AHCPR's multi-million dollar demonstration project, which is
expected to produce its first comprehensive report card within four years, is
awarding initial six month contracts for the design of the consumer survey
phase of the program. JCAHO and NCQA are each busily promoting their own
report card systems. Given their investment in data systems, each of these
various private actors has a significant interest in the adoption of their
benchmarks and format as the national standard.
E. The Goals of Information Disclosure in Health Care
Without exception, policymakers have embraced consumer-directed
information disclosure as the key to their quality assurance proposals.
Disclosure works to equalize the bargaining relationship between individual
consumers and providers so as to minimize noncompetitive bargaining.
Informational equality prevents inefficiencies that usually take the form of
noncompetitive pricing. For this reason, disclosure supporters argue that
informing consumers will preclude the need for extensive direct price
regulation. 4 ' Disclosure can also serve consumer protection goals by
enhancing product quality. In effect, requiring disclosure of important product
or service characteristics discourages producers from cutting quality corners;
producers that cut corners are likely to lose market share because informed
47. Information disclosure is a device aimed at both market protection and consumer protection.
In general economic terms, disclosure is aimed at correcting informational asymmetries between
producers and purchasers that can lead to market failure.
48. See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of ConsumerInfornation, 24 J.L. & ECON.
491, 501-509 (1981) (discussing in classical economic terms market failures that occur in the production
of information); Griffith L. Garwood et al., Consumer Disclosure in the 1990s, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
777, 779-81 (1993).
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consumers will recognize the quality gap between different products and
change their purchasing behavior accordingly.49
In the health care context, a policy of consumer-directed information
disclosure may have several specific goals. First, disclosure may be considered
an end in its own right. Consumers, it is argued, have a right to know about
their health care providers ahead of time. Accordingly, disclosure programs
are justified whether or not consumers use the information generated. A second
possible goal, and one that is a particular focus of the Clinton administration,
as well as numerous legislators and corporate benefits managers, is cost
containment. Aided by the kinds of information provided by report cards,
knowledgeable consumer decision making will foster price competition among
plans, thus holding down overall costs by rewarding low cost plans with their
business. A third goal is quality improvement. By disclosing quality data,
report cards may threaten the market share of low quality plans and thus
stimulate quality improvements. In order to attract new subscribers, plans will
have to modify their delivery of care to score well against the quality
benchmarks established for the report cards.
Report cards advance these policy goals with varying degrees of success.
Disclosure for disclosure's sake is self-validating, although a simpler format
might achieve this limited goal as effectively as would a report card. Price
disclosure may foster cost containment, but there is little evidence to support
that conclusion. At the very least, third-party insurance or employer-based
subsidies insulate most consumers against true price sensitivity, and national
report card programs will themselves be prohibitively expensive. The third
policy goal-quality assurance-may be the one to which report cards are least
suited. Given the limited state of the art in the science of quality measurement,
it is unclear whether disclosed information accurately reflects quality health
care delivery. These limits, coupled with uncertainty over how consumers
integrate this information into their health care choices, make the impact of
comprehensive disclosure on quality unknown at best, and illusory or
counterproductive at worst. To the extent that price information sways
consumers more than does quality data, quality assurance suffers. To the extent
49. Information disclosure has become an increasingly important component of the federal
government's contribution to consumer protection. Until recently, such regulation focused primarily on
mandatory disclosure of health risks. Government agencies and statutes require risk labeling for tobacco
products, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1334 (1993); pharmaceuticals, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360ee (1993); asbestos,
pesticides, and other toxins, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2655 (1993); and saccharin products, 21 U.S.C. §
343(o) (1993). Furthermore, under the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986,
companies must report the health effects of toxic chemical storage and release. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9622
(1993).
Information disclosure has moved beyond risk warnings and is now an important part, or even
the primary purpose, of a number of federal laws. For instance, the Troth in Savings Act requires banks
to release standardized financial data to patrons, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (1993), and the Fair Credit
and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988 mandates standardized credit term disclosure, 15 U.S.C. §§
1610, 1632, 1637, 1640, 1646 (1993).
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that satisfaction and quality data are not interchangeable and the former more
persuasively guide consumer choice, report cards will again fail to achieve
quality assurance.
F. Conclusion
Through the formulation of national quality measures and the
dissemination of performance data to consumers, policymakers hope to create
a market in which health care providers compete in terms of price and quality,
thus assuring quality and containing costs. To achieve this vision, most
legislative drafts propose a dizzying array of boards, councils, and foundations
to marshall the numerous players into producing a large quantity of data. The
private sector has already embraced the promise of report cards and has thus
created a growth industry in health care information processing. Whether
through public mandate or the promise of private reward, a faith in report
cards is developing.
However, the collection of data is only a first step. Translating raw data
into manageable and comprehensible information that consumers will actually
use to make discriminating quality decisions is a far harder task. Neither
policymakers nor the national boards and regional agencies they would create
are yet capable of taking that second step. Parts II and III of this Note explain
why.
II. The Current State of the Art in Quality Measurement Programs
Existing report card proposals promise more than they can deliver. The
undeveloped science of quality measurement; the high costs of data gathering,
compilation, and dissemination; and uncertainty about how consumers respond
to disclosed information undermine the quality assurance objectives of report
card systems. Congressional reform and private sector initiatives must account
for these various limitations.
First, the science of quality management is still in its infancy, "making
it unlikely that it could be applied on a national scale any time soon." 5" The
crude tools now available-mortality rates, vaccination rates, numbers of
procedures performed, data on malpractice actions brought or settled-are not
sufficient to inform consumer choice fully. Administration officials admit that
development of quality measurement techniques could take ten years.5 Others
50. Barry Meier, Health Plans Promise Choice But Decisions May Be Hard, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 1994, at Al, B8. Meier notes the following assessment by David Eddy, an expert in quality research
who helped to draft the quality provisions of the HSA: "[Alnyone who believes that we have all the
measures we need right now is kidding themselves." Id.
51. Id.
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view even that estimate as outrageously optimistic.52 It is simply unrealistic
to take the few quality related indicators now available; standardize them
nationally and regionally for case mix, severity of illness, demographics,
patient load, and a host of other barely-recognized risk adjustment factors; and
produce a report card grade that has any meaningful relationship to the quality
of care delivered. Simply identifying useful quality indicators is a monumental
task.53
Second, the costs of implementing report card proposals could be
prohibitive. In addition to the direct costs of creating various bureaucracies,
such as the National Health Board, the National Quality Management Council,
and the regional foundations proposed in several of the reform plans,
substantial indirect costs for data gathering will fall squarely on plans and
providers. The price tag for producing the report cards nationally may be
several billion dollars.54
Third, most health care institutions are not equipped to produce the kinds
of data required for a report card. Electronic information systems, which were
crucial components of the massive data gathering proposal advanced in the
Clinton Plan, have only recently arrived in large hospitals. Most such systems
are oriented more toward billing than clinical care, and efforts to refocus these
databases on clinical care and quality measurement are still in the experimental
stage. Thus far, the most comprehensive development has been the trial of the
Integrated Inpatient Management Model at the University of Michigan
Hospital. This ambitious clinical information system, covering two internal
medicine wards, combined computerized resource use and procedure tracking
with non-punitive feedback to aid providers in identifying and managing
resource-intensive patients. Though promising, this small trial represents only
a starting point for the development of process-oriented quality management
data systems. 55
Moreover, clinical information systems remain hospital based. They have
not yet focused on non-institutional outpatient settings, where the vast majority
of routine health care takes place. Some large provider networks are preparing
52. Id.
53. See Phillip Caper, Defining Quality in Medical Care, HEALTH AF., Spring 1988, 49, 51
(setting quality standards is currently an ad hoc process); David Eddy & John Billings, The Quality of
Medical Evidence: Implications for Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988, at 19, 20 (development
of reliable standards requires better data and greater ability to analyze than are presently available);
Kathleen N. Lohr et al., Current Issues in Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988, at 5, 6 (defining
quality remains a major challenge).
54. Rhonda Bergman, Report Cards Will Be Used To Measure the Performance of Health Plans:
How Might They Work?, HOSPITALS, Oct. 20, 1994, at 70 (estimate by Dr. Robert Brook, head of health
sciences program at RAND Corporation).
55. See Frederick A. Creighton et al., An Integrated Inpatient Management Model, HEALTH CARE
MGMT. REv., Winter 1990, at 61; Lawrence F. McMahon et al., The Integrated Inpatient Management
Model: A New Approach to Clinical Practices, I l I ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 318 (1989).
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for this task with substantial investment in computerized patient information
systems. Kaiser Permanente, the nation's largest HMO, recently announced
a one billion dollar, decade-long initiative to computerize patient records and
track medical procedures.56
Finally, more information in the form of raw data, statistics, and rates
may not lead to quality-based decision-making on the part of consumers. It is
currently unclear how well measurable factors reflect the quality of care.
Moreover, cognitive biases suggest that data may be de-emphasized,
overemphasized, or ignored.57
The health reform movement has spurred an intense interest in quality
assurance programs over the last several years. In addition to the private
investment in quality assurance programs occurring in hospitals and large
health plans, the federal Agency for Health Care Policy and Research has
increased its budget for health care outcomes projects from $3.6 million in
1989 to $42.6 million in 1993.5" So far, however, the "quality report card"
movement has done little more than establish, quality measurement as an
essential element of health care delivery.
A. Quality Measurement in Health Care: Satisfaction, Process, and Outcomes
A discussion of some current quality measurement programs, with a
special focus on a statewide report card program, highlights the practical
measurement, cost, and consumer processing problems that fledgling health
care information disclosure strategies will inevitably encounter. These efforts
reflect the promise and limitations of current quality measurement. Familiar
marketing tools like consumer surveys are becoming increasingly important,
but meaningful quality measurement will depend on the further development
of techniques such as process and outcomes measurement.
1. Surveys and Satisfaction
Consumer surveys play an important role in health plan management, but
their relationship to quality measurement remains ill-defined. Patient responses
to the care received certainly reflect satisfaction, but measure quality only
indirectly. Dissatisfaction can result from unhappiness with a diagnosis or from
a disability, rather than from substandard delivery of care. Inconvenience also
plays a role; in one survey an important independent variable in predicting
56. Meier, supra note 50, at BS.
57. See infra pans IHf.A-B.
58. Joe Bums, Higher Quality Means Lower Costs, in Special Report, supra note 26, at 5.
"Outcomes projects" or "outcomes research" measures what happens to patients as a result of the
treatments they receive.
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patient satisfaction in outpatient settings was time spent in the waiting room.59
The ease with which patients can make appointments, and the behavior of
receptionists, are both important determinants of satisfaction.60 A recent
research summary concluded that a consumer's choice of provider correlates
more closely with judgments based on intuition, tradition, convenience, and
word-of-mouth reputation than with objective measures of performance.6 One
marketing study found that the yellow pages ranked just below friends as the
most valuable source of information for consumers in search of a physician.62
The marketing approach to measuring quality through surveys is based
on a relative definition of quality. Disparity or gap analysis measures the
difference between initial expectations about the service provided-formed
from past experience, word of mouth, and advertising-and consumer
perceptions once service delivery is complete. Rather than representing an
objective assessment, "quality" is defined as a measure of how well care meets
or exceeds preconceived expectations.63
However, surveys do serve some important purposes. Improved patient
satisfaction can reduce patient alienation from the provider, improve
communication between care-giver and patient, and lay the groundwork for
a meaningful doctor-patient relationship. From a managerial perspective,
surveys are certainly useful. By identifying aspects of care delivery that
consumers value, executives can better market their institutions.
64
59. John C. Mowen et al., Waiting in the Emergency Room: How to Improve Patient Satisfaction,
J. HEALTH CARE MARKETING, June 1993, at 26.
60. Bernard R. Kingsley & Dennis N. Hodges, Economic Benefits of Practice Enhancement, J.
HEALTH CARE MARKETING, Dec. 1988, at 67, 67-69.
61. Robert J. Panzer & Carol Cronin, Using Information in Quality Improvement and Quality
Assurance, in PUTTING RESEARCH TO WORK IN QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND QUALITY ASSURANCE,
AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB.
No. 93-0034 (1993). Individual information-seeking behavior about specific illnesses also tends to come
from a variety of subjective sources. See, e.g., J. David Johnson & Hendrika Meischke, Cancer
Information: Women's Source and Content Preferences, J. HEALTH CARE MARKETING, Mar. 1991, at
37 (individuals receive information on cancer and other health-related issues from range of sources,
including friends and relatives, physicians, cancer-related organizations (telephone hotlines), and media;
interpersonal sources are influential because they provide information and social support); Mark Peyrot
et al., Consumer Satisfaction and Perceived Quality of Outpatient Health Services, J. HEALTH CARE
MARKETING, Jan. 1993, at 24 (finding significant correlation between perceptions of staff behavior,
atmosphere, and examination comfort with increased consumer satisfaction and willingness to recommend
provider).
62. Cathy J. Cobb-Walgren & Pratibha A. Dabholkar, The Value of Physician Advertising in the
Yellow Pages: Does the Doctor Know Best?, J. HEALTH CARE MARKETING, Mar. 1992, at 55, 55-57.
Cobb-Walgren and Dabholkar note that 28 % of the twenty million adults in the continental United States
who arrange to use a physician's services for themselves or-other family members
through the yellow pages are first time patients who do not have a specific doctor in mind when they
open the directory. Id.
63. See generally Thomas W. Whipple & Vicki L. Edick, Continuous Quality Improvement of
Emergency Services, J. HEALTH CARE MARKETING, Dec. 1993, at 26.
64. Id. Whipple and Edick describe how inpatient and outpatient satisfaction surveys were used
in a multi-institutional emergency department chain to develop detailed plans for service improvement,
appraise performance, recognize personnel, and differentiate services in a competitive market. Id.
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Though complementary, satisfaction and quality are not synonymous in
the health care context. Measures of one cannot substitute as evidence of the
other. Satisfaction is but one dimension in the definition of quality care; others
include appropriateness (relevance of care provided to clinical needs, given
current knowledge), availability, continuity (coordination of care among
providers and organizations), effectiveness, efficacy, efficiency, safety, and
timeliness.65
2. Process
Analysis of quality measurement in the service sector is a relatively new
concept. The most significant step in developing quantitative measures of
service quality was the introduction of the SERVQUAL system by
Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry in 1986. SERVQUAL was specifically
designed to measure customer perceptions of service quality. It groups the
determinants of service quality into five areas: tangibles (physical facility
attributes, appearance of personnel), reliability, responsiveness, assurance
(which encompasses aspects of communication, credibility, security,
competence, and courtesy), and empathy (which includes both access to, and
understanding of the customer).66
This focus on the process of providing service rather than on measuring
specific outcomes has only recently been applied to health care. Early findings
suggest that reliability is the most valued attribute, while tangible aspects of
service delivery, such as the office decor, rank lowest. In determining service
quality, patients, unlike physicians, tend to place more weight on
communication skills and less on technical competence. 67 The literature is
inconsistent with respect to the importance patients place on common proxies
for technical quality, such as years in practice, school attended, board
certification, and membership in professional associations. Some authors
suggest that such factors have a limited impact on consumer perceptions, 8
65. Id.
66. A. Parasuraman et al., SERVQUAL: A Multiple-Item Scale for Measuring Consumer
Perceptions of Service Quality, J. RETAILING, Spring 1988, at 12, 23; A. Parasuraman et al., A
Conceptual Model of Service Quality and Its Implicationsfor Future Research, J. MARKETING, Fall 1985,
at 41, 41-50.
67. Joby John, Improving Quality Through Patient-Provider Communication, J. HEALTH CARE
MARKETING, Dec. 1991, at 51, 58 (finding that patients' perception of high quality care depended
directly on amount of communication between staff and patient regarding nature of diagnosis and
treatment; physicians tended to rate quality based on technical competence of service provision);
Stephanie W. Walbridge & Linda M. Delene, Measuring Physician Attitudes of Service Quality, J.
HEALTH CARE MARKETING, Jan. 1993, at 6 (concluding that traditional ranking of SERVQUAL
categories derived from other service industries may not apply to health care).
68. Kenneth D. Bopp, How Patients Evaluate the Quality of Ambulatory Medical Encounters:
A Marketing Perspective, J. HEALTH CARE MARKETING, Mar. 1990, at 6, 6.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
whereas others argue that consumers do value these attributes.6 9 The entire
field of process measurement in health care remains in its infancy, and it is
unclear what conclusions we should draw from its early contributions to quality
assurance.
Understanding consumers' assessment of hospital quality is as important
as fully comprehending their reasons for choosing a physician. Initial studies
found that tertiary care level and size were the most important factors
positively related to perceptions of hospital quality. Follow-up work indicates
that many of the "process" factors that seem important in generating
satisfaction with individual providers also apply to the hospital setting; "patient
relations, medical staff, nursing staff, convenience, and technology" are
identified as factors in communicating a level of quality to consumers.70
3. Outcomes
Researchers in the field recognize that meaningful health care quality
measurement requires the development of new tools. Coupled with a process
of care analysis like SERVQUAL, outcomes research, which measures what
happens to patients as the result of the treatments they receive, is one of the
most important of these instruments. A variety of players in the health care
field have begun to implement outcomes research projects. The federal Agency
* for Health Care Policy and Research is the largest sponsor of these projects,
which include Patient Outcomes Research Teams (PORTs) to support large
scale investigations of treatments for common medical problems such as lower
back pain, diabetes, and stroke.
A joint project by the RAND Corporation and InterStudy, a nonprofit
health policy research organization, has produced the Outcomes Management
System (OMS). This computerized database combines data about patient
characteristics such as age, sex, and race; risk factors such as tobacco and
alcohol use and cholesterol levels; pre-existing health conditions; and patient
satisfaction with the results of a thirty-nine question health status questionnaire
69. Anthony R. Kovner & Helen L. Smits, Point of View: Consumer Expectations of Ambulatory
Care, HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV., winter 1978, at 69, 71. In the specific area of breast implantation,
one study found that board certification was an "important symbol in establishing credibility in advance
of personal experience with the service provider." Emin Babakus et al., Issues in the Practice of
Cosmetic Surgery: Consumers' Use of Information and Perceptions of Service Quality, J. HEALTH CARE
MARKETING, Sept. 1991, at 12, 17. One set of authors has demonstrated that the importance of process
measures of quality depends on whether there was a successful treatment outcome. See Richard S. Lytle
& Michael P. Mokwa, Evaluating Health Care Quality: The Moderating Role of Outcomes, J. HEALTH
CARE MARKETING, Mar. 1992, at 4, 4 (concluding after study of fertility clinic that process measures
were not important to consumer quality perception upon successful outcome, but were significant upon
unsuccessful outcome).
70. JOSEPH A. BoSCARINO, Hosp. & HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., THE PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION OF
QUALITY HOSPITALS II: IMPLICATIONS FOR PATIENT SURVEYS 13-31 (1992).
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that attempts to measure quality of life. This survey asks questions about daily
activities and the impact of health status on abilities to walk, work, and
participate in social activities. 7 Medical centers around the country are
currently developing disease-specific quality of life questionnaires for the
Technology of Patient Experience (TyPE) project, which adds clinical and
laboratory data, symptomatic reporting, and treatment information to the OMS
approach for conditions such as asthma, cataracts, diabetes, and prostatism.72
Connecticut hospitals launched the Towards Excellence in Care program
in 1988 to apply the Connecticut Health Information Management Exchange
(CHIME) database to the development of outcomes data. The CHIME database
contains discharge abstract information and billing information for all of
Connecticut's thirty-four acute care hospitals. The Towards Excellence in Care
program produces reports on care for particular diagnoses. For example, the
report series on cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal) compares technical
complications, total complications, and long postoperative stays at individual
hospitals with the state mean. Reports are reviewed by physician panels and
directed toward hospital medical departments and quality assurance staff rather
than the public.73
4. Risk Adjustment
The measurement of clinical outcomes as part of a larger effort to reach
general conclusions about quality must incorporate the daunting process of risk
adjustment. While the pitfalls of risk adjustment under the Clinton Plan, or any
reform proposal, are beyond the scope of this paper, some general observations
suffice to outline the challenge. Individual patients are different in so many
ways that establishing a reference group is often problematic. Also, the
presence of several illnesses in the same individual, called comorbidity, can
significantly affect the outcome measurement of the primary disease. The
interdependence of diagnoses is particularly important in elderly populations.
Quality measures must account for these confounding factors.
71. The Outcomes Management System is described in Alter& Holzman, supra note 26, at 10-11.
The RAND Health Status Survey is described in HEALTH OUTCOMES INST., OUTCOMES MEASUREMENT
INSTRUMENTATION 1, 1-3 (1993).
72. HEALTH OUTCOMES INST., supra note 71, at 1-3.
73. John T. Lynch et al., The "Towards Excellence in Care" Program: A Statewide Indicator
Project, 19 J. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 519, 519-29 (1993).
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5. Challenges in Quality Measurement
Other challenges abound in the quality research arena. Databases are
incomplete and often incompatible with other systems.74 Outcomes projects
are labor intensive for both patient and provider, and the results obtained about
different treatments are not usually products of randomized trials. Perhaps the
greatest challenge in quality research is cost. One consultant estimated initial
costs for an outcomes program measuring a modest number of variables to be
$350,000 to $550,000 over the first two years with ongoing costs of $100,000
to $250,000 per year.75
B. The Pennsylvania Report Card Program
The most ambitious and controversial attempt to combine advances in
health care quality measurement with consumer-directed information disclosure
is taking place in Pennsylvania. In 1986, the General Assembly created the
Health Care Cost Containment Council to collect and publish cost and quality
data from hospitals.76 The Clintons, in fact, referred to this agency as the
model for their proposed quality program.77 The state legislature directed the
Council to collect charge, payment, and financial data, as well as readmission,
mortality, morbidity, and infection rates, until more scientific quality and
outcomes measures were developed. The Council published its first series of
Hospital Effectiveness Reports in 1990, and new data are compiled annually.7"
Hospitals are invited to comment on any aspect of the report; the Council
publishes their responses separately.79
The most recent report, covering 1991 data, was released on February
3, 1994. It discloses the number of patients treated within fifty-three Diagnosis
Related Groups (DRGs) at each hospital. Within each DRG, the report presents
74. Many hospitals, for instance, computerize only their inpatient care data, leaving outpatient
clinic or ambulatory surgery information unrecorded.
75. Dale Shaller, senior consultant to the employers participating in the Cleveland Health Quality
Choice program, provides these estimates. Employers Get Involved in Outcomes Research, in Special
Report, supra note 26, at 26, 27.
76. Health Care Cost Containment Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 449.1-449.19 (1993);
administrative regulations found at 28 PA. CODE § VI (1993).
77. The Clinton Health Care Proposal: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (remarks by First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton urging Pennsylvania Cost
Containment Council as model); The Clinton Health Care Plan: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (remarks by First Lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton).
78. PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIL, HOSPITAL EFFECTIVENESS
REPORT 1989:1 (1990). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 449.7(a)(1)(iii), 449.5(d)(4) (1993) (data
dissemination and publication); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 911.1-911.6 (1993) (data submission and
collection); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 912.1-912.81 (1993) (data reporting requirements).
79. See PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIL, FORMAL COMMENTS:
HOSPITAL EFFECTIVENESS REPORT FOR REGION 9 (1993) [hereinafter FORMAL COMMENTS].
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the average admission severity score, the percentage of patients age sixty-five
and over, the death rates and major morbidity rates as compared to expected
values from statistical models, average length of stay, and average charge at
each hospital. The report also includes summary statistics for each hospital that
combine all the information across DRGs and present average charges adjusted
for case mix. Case mix adjustment raises or lowers the average charge based
on the number of patients treated within more costly DRGs. s
The Council has recently begun to publish a separate report series: A
Consumer Guide to Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery. These pamphlets
disclose physician specific as well as hospital based data from 1990 and 1991.
The 1990 report identified 14 out of the 170 surgeons and 7 out of the 34
hospitals as having more patient deaths than expected. The average charge for
the operation ranged from $83,851 at Graduate Hospital to $21,063 at Reading
Hospital in 1990. s" The report on 1991 data, which was significantly delayed
by budget cutbacks, identified 6 of 176 surgeons and 0 of 35 hospitals with
more patient deaths than expected. The average charge for a bypass operation
varied from $89,236 at Graduate Hospital to $23,205 at Reading.82 The
Council does not disclose physician specific charges.
Critics charge that the statistically modeled risk adjustment is grossly
inadequate, 3 and that mortality rates are a poor proxy for quality." Some
80. See generally PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIL, HOSPITAL
EFFECTIVENESS REPORT (1993) [hereinafter HOSPITAL EFFECTIVENESS REPORT]; Stacey Burling, PA
Rates Hospitals' Effectiveness, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 14, 1993, at BI.
81. Marc Kaufman, Health Panel's Report Compares Heart Surgeons' Patient Deaths, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Nov. 20, 1992, at Al (reporting that the release of the heart bypass report was prompted
by high interest, high risk, and high cost); David Zinman, Keeping Score: The New Trend Toward
Evaluating Medical Care, 7 AM. HEALTH 56, 60-62 (1993).
Hillary Rodham Clinton exaggerated the power of the Council reports to comprehensively measure
quality when she testified before the House Ways and Means Committee that there were no quality
differences between Graduate and Reading Hospitals despite the cost discrepancy. The Clinton Health
Care Proposal: Hearings on H.R. 3600 Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1993) (testimony of First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton).
82. PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIL, 2A CONSUMER GUIDE TO
CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS GRAFT SURGERY 23 (1991) [hereinafter CONSUMER GUIDE TO BYPASS
GRAFT SURGERY].
83. See Mark S. Blumberg, Biased Estimates of Expected Acute Myocardial Infarction Mortality
Using MedisGroup's Admission Severity Groups, 265 JAMA 2965 (1991) (criticizing
the "admission severity group" risk adjustment process under the Council-mandated Medical Illness
Severity Grouping System (MedisGroup) for heart attacks; finding that estimated death rates were biased
for age, location of the heart damage, history of heart failure, blood levels of potassium and urea, pulse
rate, and blood pressure, and neglected many other risk factors); Burling, supra note 80, at BI (reporting
dissatisfaction within the Pennsylvania hospital industry with the MedisGroup risk-adjustment system;
giving the example that the rates are not adjusted for mortality due to patient-directed DNR ("Do Not
Resuscitate") orders); Kristin E. Holmes, Health-Care Report: Hospitals Beg to Differ, PHILA. INQUIRER,
June 6, 1991, at H3 (reporting that proximity to a nursing home-which is not included in the risk
adjustment formula-may increase the severity of the patient mix at an individual hospital); Kaufman,
supra note 81, at Al (reporting the release of physician-specific mortality rates for coronary artery
bypass operations and charges from the medical community of inadequate risk and severity adjustment);
Wilbur B. Pittinger, Comparing Hospital Costs Not Simple, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 12, 1993, at AI0;
Letter from Wilbur B. Pittinger, Executive Director, Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, to
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fear that emphasis on mortality rates, coupled with insufficient risk adjustment
for illness severity, will prompt hospitals to avoid accepting the sickest
patients."s One recent refinement in the 1991 Hospital Effectiveness Report
has been separate reporting for cancer and non-cancer patients within DRGs
where cancer is a common underlying condition.
Other critics complain that the average cost data is misleading; the Council
does not correct for location specific property values, wage rates, teaching
costs, or charge differences attributable to interest on debt incurred for
renovation and modernization.86 More importantly, the cost charged does not
reflect the actual payment received. For example, Graduate Hospital received
an average of $23,974 of its $83,851 charge, and Reading Hospital collected
$18,221 from its $21,063 charge. 7 The hospitals also complain about the
roughly $150,000 per year cost of mandated participation. They contend that
Ernest J. Sessa, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (Sept. 3,
1993), in FORMAL COMMENTS, supra note 79, at § E (arguing that effectiveness reports are poor
consumer guides to quality because the risk adjustment process for patient severity underestimates the
complexity of cases at academic teaching hospitals relative to community hospitals and because mortality
rates do not account for DNR orders); Letter from Robert B. Kimmel, Senior Vice President, Albert
Einstein Health Care Network, to Ernest J. Sessa, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Health Care Cost
Containment Council (Sept. 13, 1993), in FORMAL COMMENTS, supra note 79, at § A (pointing out that
MedisGroup mortality predictions are skewed by the exclusion of DNR orders and refusals of treatment).
The FORMAL COMMENTS, supra note 79, are filled with criticism of the MedisGroup risk
adjustment and severity scoring system. One surgical group complained that full cardiac arrest
immediately prior to a CABG operation with CPR continuing until the incision received only a 2.5 out
of 4 on the severity scale. See Letter from Dr. George J. Magovern, Cardio-Thoracic Surgical
Associates, Inc., to Ernest J. Sessa, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment
Council (Jan. 18, 1994), in PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIL, 2 CORONARY
ARTERY BYPASS GRAFr SURGERY: HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN COMMENTS (1994).
In response to these criticisms, the Council increased the number of risk adjustment factors it used
to predict patient mortality in CONSUMER GUIDE TO BYPASS GRAF SURGERY, supra note 82, covering
1991 data. It now adjusts forage, gender, previous bypass surgery, shock, congestive heart failure, renal
dialysis, renal failure, recent heart attack, and diabetes, in addition to the MedisGroup severity index
for vital organ failure. Id. at 6-7.
84. See generally Stephen F. Jencks, Quality Assurance, 263 JAMA 2679 (1990) (summarizing
studies that suggest sensitivity and specificity of mortality rates as proxy for quality depends largely on
risk adjustment process).
85. Kaufman, supra note 81, at Al (quoting opinion of the director of the Hospital of University
of Pennsylvania's quality assurance program: "It's going to be very difficult to sustain our role in the
community [of taking any patient, no matter how sick] if there is extensive pressure to get our rates
down.").
86. Holmes, supra note 83, at H3; Ralph Vigoda & Stacey Burling, Report on Costs: The
Hospitals Beg to Differ, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 6, 1991, at M3 (quoting Ellen Mattes, public relations
manager for Bryn Mawr Hospital).
87. Dana Priest, Hospital Bills Can Prove Hollow Basisfor Comparison of Health Care Costs,
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1993, at A6; Letter from Samuel H. Steinberg, President and Chief Executive
Officer of Graduate Hospital, to Ernest J. Sessa, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Health Care Cost
Containment Council (Sept. 8, 1993), in FORMAL COMMENTS, supra note 79, at § C (stating that
received percentage of the actual charge varied from 17.4% to 38.2 % for fourteen of the most common
DRGs).
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the total cost to the state's hospitals for compliance with the various Council
studies has been $28 million to date."8
In what may be its most important task in the next few years, the Council
has begun to study how, or indeed whether, consumers have used the published
reports.89 One anecdotal report reveals the complexity of consumer response.
A patient told the president of a low cost hospital that she was switching to
another institution because she thought "she could get better care at a place
that charged more. "90 The results from an earlier project are also instructive.
After the Health Care Financing Administration's publication of hospital
mortality rates in 1987, one study found that the "death list" had no discernible
behavioral effects on consumer choice of hospital.9"
C. Other Experiments with Report Card Systems
In addition to the Pennsylvania program, several other demonstration
projects are experimenting with the report card format. As previously
mentioned, private agencies, managed care plans, and major corporations have
created a new industry in health care information processing by embracing
report cards. A number of major managed care plans are using NCQA's
employer-sponsored Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS),
which compiles technical, access, satisfaction, utilization, and plan
management data into a performance report, to compare individual plan
performance against benchmarks.
The initial versions of most HEDIS-based report cards compare plan-
specific rates in several categories with either comparable plans, the national
average, or goals established by the Department of Health and Human
Services' Healthy People 2000: National Health Promotion and Disease
Prevention Objectives. These categories may include: preventive services such
as childhood immunization, cholesterol screening, mammography screening,
and cervical cancer screening rates; prenatal care indices including the
percentage of low birth weight babies and the incidence of early prenatal care;
data on specific chronic diseases such as hospitalization rates for asthma
patients; access indicators reflecting the ease of making an appointment; and
88. Melissa Dribben & Stacey Burling, Hospitals Contest Report's Diagnosis, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Sept. 2, 1990, at H4; Priest, supra note 87, at A6. The president of the Delaware Valley Hospital
Council also estimated that it cost its sixty member hospitals about ten million dollars to install computer
systems for reporting data to the Council. See Wanda Motley, Hospital Study is Criticized as Narrow,
Shallow, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 30, 1990, at H27.
89. Meier, supra note 50, at B8.
90. Vigoda & Burling, supra note 86, at M3.
91. Bruce Vladeck et al., Consumers and Hospitals: The HCFA "Death List, HEALTH AFF.,
Spring 1988, at 122, 122-25.
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general patient satisfaction rates.92 But even NCQA's vice president of
planning and development admits: "We don't know yet how good these
performance measures are. "" The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) also plans to publish a summary of hospital
compliance with fifty areas of accreditation standards and has recently
developed its own quality database to compete with HEDIS.94
Self-help quality assessment is also available. On-line services like
CompuServe offer a number of health care related forums that allow users to
request information. Subscribers can obtain data on specific diagnoses and
treatments or request opinions about hospitals and providers from other
members.95 Magazines like Consumer Reports, New York, and U.S. News &
World Report now publish lists ranking regional hospitals, plans, and
doctors."' Capitalizing on a recent flurry of report card disclosures in St.
Louis, a specialty magazine called Health Pages now compiles and explains
comparative performance data on local managed care organizations."
D. Conclusion
This snapshot of the current state of health care quality measurement
shows that policymakers want to write the book on quality before learning its
language. The effort to develop analytical systems that accurately measure
quality of care has just begun in earnest. The initial stages of this research
must be completed before a massive disclosure campaign is put in place. The
multi-billion dollar price tag of a national report card program urges caution
in mandating disclosure until health care quality can be accurately measured.
Once quality measures are available, then consumer responses to disclosure
must be further examined before the report cards can earn a passing grade.
The insights of cognitive psychologists into information processing, information
overload, and consumer behavior, added to the lessons learned from nutrition
labeling and truth in lending laws, begin that exploration.
92. Paul J. Kenkel, Health Plans Face Pressure to Find 'Report Card" Criteria That Will Make
the Grade, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 10, 1994, at 41.
93. Id.
94. See Donald L. Zimmerman, Grading the Graders: Using "Report Cards" to Enhance the
Quality of Care Under Health Care Reform, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 642
(1994).
95. Cathryn Conroy, Care Takers, COMPUSERVE MAG., Feb. 1994, at 10.
96. See, e.g. ,Doug Podolsky, America's Best Hospitals, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 15,
1992, at 60 (ranking hospitals nationwide based on physician surveys).
97. Kenkel, supra note 92, at 41.
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III. Cognitive Psychology, Information Processing, and Disclosure Strategies:
Lessons from Nutrition Labeling and Truth in Lending
The identification of useful health care quality indicators would hardly
give a report card system instant credibility as a quality assurance tool.
Consumers must use the data in ways that reward quality care. At some level,
increased disclosure becomes too complex for consumers to assimilate within
a reasonable search time, too expensive for providers, and too extensive to
regulate effectively.9" A key step is to identify elements of disclosure that are
meaningful in the decision-making process and that are not too complex or
cumbersome for a system to provide. Simplifications of disclosure schemes,
such as the revision of the Truth In Lending Act (TILA) in the 1970s that
culminated in the Truth In Lending Simplification and Reform Act (TILSRA),
embody this search for a balance between the utility and magnitude of
disclosure. This Note examines the work of cognitive psychologists and
marketing researchers, as well as two specific programs of consumer directed
information disclosure: nutrition labeling under the Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act (NLEA),99 and disclosure of credit terms under the Truth In
Lending Act (TILA).'"
A. Heuristics, Biases, and Information Overload
The increasing complexity of everyday life and the birth of the
information age have spawned a feverish interest in how people process
information. One commentator has noted that research and debate within
decision-making theory and cognitive psychology produce over 250 new
articles every month.' °' But the study of how we internalize, comprehend,
and act upon data is not new. In the 1950s and 1960s, pioneers such as Paul
Meehl, Ward Edwards, Herbert Simon, and Jerome Bruner began to explore
cognitive processes, and thereby uncovered fascinating and sometimes
unsettling patterns in the ways that we think. These insights into our decision-
making and information processing abilities provide a useful starting point for
analyzing how health care consumers respond to packaged quality data.
A fundamental tenet of human thought is that of limits. We are limited
in the amount of information we can use, and, equally important for this
98. In economic terms, this represents the point at which marginal costs of information disclosure
surpass its marginal benefits.
99. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (1993).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1993).
101. Robert P. Abelson & Ariel Levi, Decision Making and Decision Theory, 1 THE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985).
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discussion, the manner in which we use it. The study of cognitive psychology
describes the nature of these limitations.
0 2
Ward Edwards' introduction of Bayesian analysis into psychology
produced a model of rational judgment by an idealized person under conditions
of uncertainty. This model provided an "optimal rule about how opinions
should be revised on the basis of new information.""03 Researchers then
began to explore the adaptive processes that so often confounded the
predictions of Bayesian models in actual experience. This search led to
numerous biases and heuristics, or "rules of thumb," that individuals use as
cognitive tools to simplify difficult mental tasks.
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman describe three principal
heuristics-representative, availability, and anchoring-that people use to
process probabilistic data, as well as the systematic errors and biases that these
heuristics can produce in the cognitive process." These researchers and
others identify additional factors, such as framing, invulnerability, and
overload, that also affect the way consumers respond to information. Each of
these elements demonstrates that health care consumers might not use the
report cards in the manner intended by their architects, and therefore that the
report card system might not assure health care quality.
102. According to Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic, and Daniel Kahneman, three deans of cognitive
psychology, the discipline is concernd with "internal processes, mental limitations, and the way in which
the processes are shaped by the limitations." Kahneman et al., supra note 26, at xii. A useful summary
is Ward Edwards & Detlof Von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the Law,
59 S. CAL. L. REv. 225 (1986) (reviewing the literature on cognitive psychology and suggesting three
kinds of challenges a lawyer may encounter in an adversary system: experiencing confusion regarding
the case at hand, discrediting an expert witness, and luring a decision-maker into an erroneous decision).
Other interesting work on the incorporation of cognitive psychology research into the law has occurred
in the courtroom context. See Lea Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 363
(1986) (discussing "jury wobble"); see also Victor J. Gold, Jury Wobble: Judicial Tolerance of Jury
Inferential Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 391,406 (1986) (defining jury wobble as the "rendition of verdicts
based on inferential error"). See generally Richard Lempert, Error Behind the Plate and in the Law,
59 S. CAL. L. REv. 407 (1986) (criticizing Brilmayer's conclusion that "error cannot exist in the legal
system in the commonsensical meaning of the word"); Robert S. Thompson, Legitimate and Illegitimate
Decisional Inconsistency: A Comment on Brilmayer's "Wobble, or the Death of Error, " 59 S. CAL. L.
REv. 423 (1986) (classifying "decisional inconsistency," which he prefers to "wobble," into inevitable
inconsistency, deliberate inconsistency, bias inconsistency, careless
inconsistency, defective information inconsistency, and relationship of forms of inconsistency).
103. Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing, in Kahneman et al., supra
note 26, at 359; see also Ward Edwards et al., Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research,
70 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (1963).
104. The following discussion is based on Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Kahneman et al., supra note 26, at 3-20, which originally appeared
in 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). See also Maya Bar-Hillel, Studies of Representativeness, in Kahneman et
al., supra note 26, at 69; Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in Kahneman et al.,
supra note 26, at 48-68, which originally appeared in 80 PSYCHOL. REv. 237 (1973).
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1. Representative Heuristics
People tend to make judgments by representativeness. In other words, they
draw conclusions about "A" based on the ways in which it resembles
something familiar, "B." Consider the example of a report card detailing the
successful cesarean section birth rate in a particular health plan. Using
representative reasoning, consumers may incorporate an above average
successful cesarean section rate into a favorable judgment about the plan's
quality of deliveries in general, or about the quality of other obstetric
surgeries. Consumers using such representative heuristics might likewise
impute a hospital's success in coronary artery bypass graft surgery to balloon
angioplasty for the treatment of atherosclerotic heart disease.
Representative heuristics create a number of biases. Representative
judgments are insensitive to the prior probability of outcomes, or the base rate
frequency of events. They are insensitive to sample size, which should affect
the probability of obtaining a particular result in statistical models.
Representative heuristics also create an illusion of validity, which fosters
unwarranted confidence in the predictive accuracy of a result based solely on
the strength of the resemblance between the specific and stereotyped data.l 5
Finally, representative heuristics obscure the statistical laws of regression. That
is, reasoning by representation masks the fact that a random sampling of inputs
tends to converge toward a mean. Tversky and Kahneman demonstrate that,
except in elementary examples, even the most sophisticated statistical
researchers make systematic errors because of representative reasoning."
The implications of representative heuristic biases for health care quality
data are significant. These biases predict that people will tend to overdraw
conclusions about data from a limited situation and place unwarranted
confidence in those conclusions. The coronary artery bypass graft example,
noted above, highlights this danger. Bypass grafts and angioplasty are the
domain of separate departments and distinct specialists. Furthermore, bypass
graft surgery is often the fallback procedure for unsuccessful balloon
angioplasty. At the very least, consumers may fail to account for the complex
interaction between different health care services, even though that interaction
may have significant quality implications.
105. See also Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, in Kahneman et al., supra
note 26, at 287-93 (discussing systematic overconfidence of psychologists in their predictive abilities
about behavior of case study patients due to familiarity).
106. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in Small Numbers, in Kahneman et al., supra
note 26, at 23-31. This article appeared originally in 2 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105 (1971).
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2. Availability Heuristics
Another adaptive process, the availability heuristic, also has profound
implications for the way in which consumers may act on health plan quality
data. This paradigm demonstrates that "people assess the ... probability of
an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to
mind. "107
Availability heuristics also lead to predictable biases. The salience, or
vividness, of the retrievable experience affects the dominance of the heuristic
and the degree of cognitive error. Thus, people consistently overestimate the
frequency of dramatic causes of death, such as accidents, natural disasters, and
homicides, as compared to less spectacular events, such as disease.' Easily
imagined contingencies influence reasoning more than unarticulated fears,
although both events may have the same prior probability of occurring. One
set of researchers characterizes this bias as a difference in the ways in which
we interpret concrete and abstract data. "If people are unmoved by the sorts
of dry, statistical data that are dear to the hearts of scientists and policy
planners, then social and technological progress must be impeded unless
effective, concrete, emotionally interesting ways of communicating conclusions
are developed."" °9
One important effect of availability heuristics is that people tend to have
a particularly difficult time thinking about low probability events. On the one
hand, people tend to discount low probabilities when there is no readily
retrievable experience. On the other hand, people overestimate probability
when such experience is available. Rates of disease, operative mortality,
infection, and the like are so often low that we tend to ignore or
overemphasize data, thus introducing a significant cognitive bias into efforts
to utilize quality information.
Availability biases predict that quality indicators tracking low probability
events will have diminished impact, even if the relationship of these indicators
to overall quality is objectively significant. Vivid information, such as
successful limb reattachments, will assume disproportionate importance over
less salient events, such as infection rates. However, a person whose family
member once suffered an infection after a surgical procedure will overestimate
107. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 104, at 11; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COoNrTIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 220-22
(1973) (demonstrating that test subjects overestimated probability that first names permitted unambiguous
identification of gender).
108. Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in Kahneman et al.,
supra note 26, at 466-67.
109. Richard E. Nisbett et al., Popular Induction: Information is Not Necessarily Informative,
in Kahneman et al., supra note 26, at 115. For additional discussion of biases inherent in availability
heuristics, see Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, in
Kahneman et al., supra note 26, at 179.
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the probability of post-surgical infections, despite a surgical quality grade
signalling an average rate." In either case, availability biases could
significantly distort the value of quality data.
3. Anchoring Heuristics
People also typically rely on an anchoring heuristic. Through anchoring,
people use objective data to make adjustments from a subjectively constructed
starting point. This preconception is developed through personal experience
and influenced in the first place by representative and availability heuristics.
The final probability estimates, in which people tend to have great confidence,
are inevitably biased toward the initial values."'
Anchoring biases undermine the impact of objective data. If one person
begins from the proposition that the probability of malpractice is only 2%, and
the actual frequency is 8%, he will ultimately undervalue the probability of
malpractice through insufficient adjustment away from his anchoring point.
Similarly, someone who presupposes malpractice at 20% will systematically
overestimate the actual probability despite an objective measure of 8%.
4. Framing Effects
In addition to heuristic processes, the manner in which information is
presented has a profound effect on consumer behavior and perceptions. This
"framing effect" reveals that people respond differently to equivalent questions
depending on whether they are framed as losses or gains. People prefer an
80% chance of survival over a 20% chance of dying, although the two are
mathematically identical. Out of the framing effect developed "prospect
theory," which posits that people are risk averse in the domain of gains, risk
seeking in the domain of losses, and more sensitive to losses than to gains." 2
Although the framing effect may be more applicable to individual point
of treatment decisions, a variation of the basic principle shows its relevance
to a yearly health plan point of insurance choice based on quality grades.
Suppose a plan's overall surgical mortality increased in one year from one in
10,000 to 1.5 in 10,000. Consumers would probably have a strongly negative
response if the data were framed as a 50% rise in surgical mortality.
113
110. For a discussion of the applicability of availability heuristics to risk perception, see Slovic
et al., supra note 108, at 463-84.
111. See id. at 475 (discussing heuristics, overconfidence, and hyperprecision).
112. The literature on framing effects was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
and is nicely summarized in Richard L. Hasen, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect
of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REv. 391 (1990).
113. This example is adapted from an example presented in Slovic et al., supra note 108, at 478-
79.
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The type of bias exemplified above could be minimized across plans by
a report card with standardized presentation formats. Nevertheless, health care
system framers should recognize that consumers' quality evaluations might be
influenced by the loss-framed elements of the quality data set more than the
gain-framed elements. Therefore, particular caution should be taken when
using mortality rates as quality indicators for low risk procedures. Given our
loss sensitivity, people might respond disproportionately to any mortality
figures, however small, even if other, more reflective measurements of quality
are available.
5. Invulnerability Biases
Finally, a cognitive illusion of invulnerability to disease may limit the
beneficial effects of quality information disclosure. Researchers have noted that
people often believe themselves to be immune from risks that they nonetheless
admit are significant for others." 4 This may be a defense mechanism against
a complex, uncertain world filled with confusing probabilistic information, an
attempt to reduce "cognitive dissonance" by ignoring disturbing data."t5 One
commentator has labelled this effect "motivational distortion."" l6 If healthy
people feel that data about uncomfortable disease related or care related events
are irrelevant to them, they will make decisions based on criteria other than
quality information.
6. Information Overload
Marketing and consumer behavior research adds the important concept
of information overload to our discussion of information disclosure and
processing. Put simply, overload theory postulates that consumers do not act
as rational utility maximizers in the face of an overabundance of data; instead,
they completely ignore most or all of the information presented." 7
Consumers provided with too much information disregard most of it and
therefore make objectively poorer decisions."' Alternatively, consumers may
114. Paul Slovic et al., Informing the Public About the Risks from Ionizing Radiation, in
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 114, 116 (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth
R. Hammond eds., 1986).
115. See George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive
Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1982).
116. Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 653 (1993).
117. See Jacob Jacoby et al., Corrective Advertising and Affirmative Disclosure Statements: Their
Potential for Confusing and Misleading the Consumer, J. MARKETING, Winter 1982, at 61, 70.
118. Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load, J.
MARKETING REs., Feb. 1974, at 63, 63-69; Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function
of Information Load: Replication and Extension, I J. CONSUMER RES. 33, 33-42 (1974) [hereinafter
Jacoby et al., Replication and Extension] (confirming earlier findings of decline in purchasing
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unconsciously avoid overload by selectively accessing subsets of presented
information." 9 As a result, choices are based on a fraction of the significant
data.
One study refined the overload paradigm and found that decision
effectiveness, defined as the ability to make optimal choices among alternatives
in a set, varied directly with information quality and inversely with information
quantity. 20 Other studies have suggested that optimal levels of information
disclosure will vary with type of consumer population and type of information
presented, either graphic, verbal, or numerical.' 2'
The description of information overload in the marketing literature initially
focused on product labeling, but overload analysis has also been applied to
warning labels'22 and has entered the legal literature in discussions of new
home warranties,' 23 mortgage rules,'24 prescription drug information under
performance with increasing product information load and concluding that there are finite limits to
consumers' ability to accommodate substantial amounts of data within limited time span). See also James
R. Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in Designing Effective Labels for Presenting Risk
Information, 5 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 1, 7 (1986) (pointing out that main issue in presenting
information on warning labels is to provide sufficient information for informed choices but not so much
that consumers process it selectively and suboptimally); Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and
Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 419, 427 (1982) (finding support for theory of
information overload in the literature on memory and information theory; criticizing Jacoby's original
research design but supporting the conclusion that consumer decision-making can suffer from information
overload); Debra L. Scammon, "Information Load"and Consumers, 4 J. CONSUMER RES. 148, 148-55
(1977) (finding that increased information load causes consumers to divide their attention and results
in poorer recall; further, increased information load may impart more knowledge but has little
demonstrable effect on attitudes, behavior, or brand preference).
119. Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 432, 435 (1984).
But cf Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision
Making, 10 J. CONSUMER REs. 436, 439 (1984) (arguing that consumers can and will become
overloaded).
120. Kevin L. Keller & Richard Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on
Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 200, 200-13 (1987).
121. Jacoby et al., Replication and Extension, supra note 118, at 41; Naresh K. Malhotra et al.,
The Information Overload Controversy: An Alternative Viewpoint, J. MARKETING, Spring 1982, at 27,
35.
122. WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION
90-105 (1992).
123. Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied
Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993
Wis. L. REv. 13 (1993).
124. William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need For Mortgage Rules
Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70
VA. L. REv. 1083 (1984); George J. Wallace, "Explicit Pricing, Fraud, and Consumer Information:
The Reform of RESPA, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 183, 197-98, 206-07 (applying overload analysis to consumer
misunderstanding of real estate closing costs).
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the Food and Drug Act,"2 nutrition labeling, and truth in lending
disclosure. 126
Advertising research further clarifies the overload paradigm. In one study
of physician advertisements, the authors found surprisingly little variation in
consumer response to low and high information ads. One possible explanation
offered was that "people may experience a sensory overload in the processing
of health care communication."
127
Recognition of limiting factors, such as overload and heuristic biases,
leads to the conclusion that data disclosure is only a first step towards a
consumer protection or quality assurance goal. Disclosure of objective quality
measurements will be ineffective and possibly counterproductive, unless such
cognitive distortions are adequately addressed.
B. The Relevance of Cognitive Psychology and Information Overload to
Health Care Policy: The Pitfalls of Satisficing Behavior in a Quality
Assurance Program
The theory of information overload and the relevance of cognitive
psychology to policymaking remain controversial. Some critics contend that
more information always aids the consumer in making choices and that
information overload never occurs. 121 Others argue that consumers can
actually process a great deal of information, but that some definite limits exist.
The more common limiting factor, they contend, is not the consumer's ability
to process information, but rather willingness to process information. 29 Yet
another interpretation of the evidence holds that consumers may not overload,
but instead may not process information at all due to anxiety and a desire to
avoid dense textual information. 130
While cognitive psychologists provide interesting descriptions of the
limitations on our processing abilities, critics argue that their work is only
marginally relevant to policymaking on information disclosure. These critics
describe consumers as quasi-rational actors, limited by cognitive
125. Comment, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Consumer-Directed Information-Enhancing
the Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 117, 145-47 (1984) (concluding that fears
of information overload should not prevent disclosing drug information to consumers as well as
physicians).
126. See discussion infra parts m.C-D.
127. Cobb-Walgren & Dabholkar, supra note 62, at 55.
128. J. Edward Russo, More Information is Better: A Reevaluation of Jacoby, Speller and Kohn,
1 J. CONSUMER RES. 68, 71-72 (1974) (arguing that confusion decreased with increased data, as long
as subjects took enough time to process the information); John 0. Summers, Less Information Is Better?,
J. MARKETING REs., Nov. 1974, at 467, 467-68.
129. Malhotra et al., supra note 121, at 27-37.
130. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 310 (1986).
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constraints."' This quasi-rational consumer "satisfices" instead of
"optimizes," by reaching the best decision he can given the circumstances.
Satisficing behavior results in choosing the best alternative from a non-
exhaustive search when search costs are high. These critics dismiss cognitive
psychology's-contribution to policy formation because they believe that the gap
between the satisficed and optimal choice is simply too narrow to justify
extensive government regulation of most markets that are plagued by
information asymmetries.132
These critics contend that the competitive market acts as a safety net for
our internal cognitive limitations. The systematic mental errors that individuals
make when faced with raw data, they argue, do not translate into worrisome
market failures. Rather, the market absorbs heuristics and biases in two basic
ways. First, so long as a few vigilant and sophisticated consumers can interpret
the data, they effectively police the market for all consumers. Second,
consumers can accurately value their own experience with a product despite
cognitive constraints in evaluating its objective characteristics, and can thus
reward good producers with repeat business."'
1. Price, Satisfaction, and Quality: Distinct Dimensions of the Market
Safety Net
But the market safety net that critics of cognitive psychology describe
solves only part of the problem in health care quality assurance. Put simply,
it is a satisfaction and cost safety net, but not a quality safety net. If, in the
course of a non-exhaustive and cognitively constrained search, satisficing
consumers choose plans based on geographic convenience, waiting time to
appointment, and staff pleasantries, as early evidence suggests, then the market
will reward plans that fulfill these needs. This safety net only protects against
failure in the satisfaction market. With regard to cost, the standardization of
the benefits packages and publication of annual enrollment fees allows
consumers to make apples-to-apples comparisons between plan services and
131. Hasen, supra note 112, at 392.
132. David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search
and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 277-303 (1986); see also Roberta Romano, A Comment on
Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REv.
313, 313-27 (1986) (agreeing with Grether that information overload is not a significant issue in
consumer law); Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaling: An Essay on the
Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 329, 329-
37, 361 (1986) (arguing that information overload and cognitive error are less relevant to legal analysis
of consumer behavior than is choice management theory, in which consumers follow a rational pre-set
strategy of self control; also arguing that the psychological
literature on human error and decision-making leads legal analysts to the incorrect conclusion that
inherently fallible behavior is correctable through legal regulation).
133. Grether et al., supra note 132, at 277-303.
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to shop based on price. But this safety net only protects against failure in the
price market.
For the most important goal of the report card program, quality assurance,
there is no safety net. Satisfaction and quality are complementary, but one does
not guarantee or perfectly predict the other. Policymakers, therefore, want
report cards to create a market for quality. However, in addition to the fact
that we do not yet know what to measure, we also do not know if consumers
will choose according to quality factors rather than satisfaction factors when
given both types of data.
The appeal to corporate benefits managers, who are particularly sensitive
to employee perceptions, of relying heavily on satisfaction data is undeniable.
In praising the Health Institute's Employee Health Care Value Survey, one
Xerox executive noted that the results of consumer satisfaction surveys could
provide the basis for discontinuation of the company's relationship with a
particular plan. 34 That this might be the case is not surprising, since
management is sensitive to worker preferences in a number of areas besides
health benefits. Considered in this light, decisions regarding point of insurance
choices are quality decisions only to the extent that satisfaction approximates
quality; marketing research has shown that the scope of that overlap in health
care is thoroughly unclear. The important point is not that such decision
making is invalid, because it is not, but rather that we should not misconstrue
it as quality assurance. Admittedly, if free substitution between quality and
satisfaction is ever established, then this approach to quality assurance
represents a substantially lower cost alternative not only to the comprehensive
report card systems proposed in legislation, but to all other quality assurance
programs as well.
If, however, identity between satisfaction and quality is less than perfect,
then simply including both sets of data in the same document will not cure the
defect. Put simply, if disclosed information related to satisfaction guides
consumer choice more persuasively than quality data, then report cards will
never perform the quality assurance role that has been predicted for them.
Even if consumers do utilize the quality data, processing biases will confound
consumer quality choices; cognitive errors could minimize the market share
rewards for meeting typically de-emphasized quality benchmarks or they could
exaggerate the penalties for missing over-emphasized ones. The heuristics,
biases, and information overload paradigms described by cognitive
psychologists and marketers are directly relevant to health care policymakers
precisely because they reveal the quality hole in the market safety net. That
134. Adam Peck, Employees Rate Health Plan Options, MANAGED HEALTHCARE, Dec. 1993,
at 36, 36 (quoting Judd Everhart).
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hole should make us hesitant about claiming that the report cards will be a
powerful quality assurance mechanism.
The distinction between assuring satisfaction and quality is crucial. Critics
of cognitive psychology, such as David Grether, Alan Schwartz, and Louis
Wilde, discount internal processing difficulties because satisficing consumers,
they argue, do not ignore relevant information to the extent that it would
discourage optimally satisfying choices.' But arguing that cognitive
constraints are similarly irrelevant in the health care report card context proves
the wrong point. The main issue in applying cognitive limitations to an analysis
of the disclosures in the report card proposal is not their effects on consumer
satisfaction. As Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde would explain, despite any
biases in processing data, report cards certainly have the potential to increase
satisfaction as long as the new health care market becomes competitive.
Instead, cognitive limitations are vitally relevant to the quality assurance aspect
of report cards in health care information disclosure. Satisfaction plays into
quality assurance only insofar as the data satisficing consumers use can also
serve as quality proxies. Since we have not yet developed a range of reliable
quality proxies, the report cards cannot possibly rationally reflect quality. Even
once those proxies are developed from the intense research described in part
II, if report cards are to function as a quality assurance program, then the task
becomes that of designing disclosure so that satisficing decisions double as
quality decisions. Understanding the heuristics, biases, and information
quantity limitations described by cognitive psychologists-in other words,
understanding the components of our satisficing decisions rather than simply
their effects on satisfaction-is the only way to assure this overlap and turn
the report cards into a quality assurance tool.
2. Policy Implications for Report Card Systems
If consumers misinterpret, overload, or fail to process complex health care
quality data, then we must be cautious about what we expect report cards to
accomplish. If report card disclosure requirements are selected with the
economic, rational utility maximizing consumer in mind, they might disserve
the satisficing consumer. Report cards would not be powerful quality or cost
containment tools if people tend to ignore them. Even worse, over-inclusive
information disclosure may be a counterproductive quality tool if the satisficing
consumer fixates on parts of the data set that do not independently reflect
quality.'36 Consumers are neither rational utility maximizers nor wholly
135. Grether et al., supra note 132, at 284-94; see also Romano, supra note 132, at 313-27.
136. For instance, waiting time for appointments is important to the satisficing consumer. A point
of insurance decision based on waiting time may be valid for that consumer, but it only rewards quality
care if waiting time is independently reflective of quality care. See supra discussion in part I.
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irrational impulse buyers; characterizing the middle ground in each market is
a prerequisite to an information disclosure program aimed at guaranteeing
quality. Faith in report cards as the foundation of a quality assurance program
without a clear understanding of the relationship between disclosed price,
satisfaction, quality information, and consumer behavior is badly misplaced.
With this theoretical background of information disclosure and consumer
cognitive response as our foundation, we now turn to nutrition labeling and
truth in lending disclosure in an attempt to glean some practical lessons for
health care reform from past experience.
C. The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
The modern regulatory system governing the food industry stems from
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Section 341 of the Act
authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to prohibit the mislabeling
of food. Section 343 defines mislabeled foods to include any item not in
compliance with the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990
(NLEA). 137
Under the NLEA, Congress and the FDA have embarked on an ambitious
campaign to use informational strategies to modify consumer behavior.
Amendments which went into effect on May 8, 1994 make nutrition labeling
mandatory for all products intended for human consumption and offered for
sale.'38 This effort complements the regulation of package labeling, under
which Congress requires food producers to meet FDA definitions of common
terms, such as "free," "low," "lite," "reduced," "fresh," and "high."' 39
Assertions about positive health claims are permitted only if they are supported
by scientific evidence and communicate clear and complete information about,
for example, the links between calcium and osteoporosis, lipids and cancer,
sodium and hypertension, cholesterol and heart disease, fiber and cancer, or
fruits and vegetables and cancer. "°
With respect to information disclosure which directly concerns nutritional
content, the statutory provisions of the NLEA are quite specific. The statute
deems food mislabeled unless its label bears nutritional information that
provides standard serving size in an amount customarily consumed; the number
of servings per container; the total number of calories per serving size derived
from any source; the number of calories per serving derived specifically from
137. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), amended by 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1993).
138. 58 Fed. Reg. 2175, 17328 (1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101.9) (effective May 8,
1994).
139. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r) (1993); Fair Packaging and Labeling Program, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61
(1988), amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1453-4 (Supp. IV 1992).
140. 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.72-101.78 (1993).
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fat; and the amount of total fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sodium, total
carbohydrates, complex carbohydrates, sugars, protein, dietary fiber, and any
vitamin or mineral per serving. The goal of this lengthy disclosure is to "assist
consumers in maintaining healthy dietary practices." The FDA, through the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, may require additions to or deletions
from the nutritional information disclosure list if they will assist consumers
in maintaining healthy dietary practices. The statute also provides the Secretary
with authority to regulate the format in which nutritional information is
presented; she can promulgate regulations that require highlighting, specific
typefaces, or color schemes to assist consumers in noticing the
information. 141
The FDA regulations promulgated under the statute are even more
extensive and specific than the NLEA statutory provisions. This degree of
specificity extends to both content and presentation. For instance, the nutrition
label must be contiguous and to the right of the principal display panel of a
packaged food, and the letters and numbers must be no less than one-sixteenth
of an inch in height. 142
Nutrition labeling constitutes an extensive section of the federal
regulations. A "serving" is defined precisely as that "reasonable quantity of
food suited for or practicable of consumption as part of a meal by an adult
male engaged in light physical activity, or by an infant or child under four
years of age when the article purports or is represented to be for consumption
by an infant or child under four years of age.""' Nutrition labels must list
specified information, some of which is optional, in a prescribed order: serving
size, servings per container, total calories, calories from fat, calories from
saturated fat, total fat, saturated fat, polyunsaturated fat, monounsaturated fat,
cholesterol, sodium, potassium, total carbohydrates, dietary fiber, sugars,
sugar alcohol, other carbohydrates, protein, and percentages of U.S.
Recommended Daily Intakes (RDI) expressed as a percentage of daily value
(DRV) of at least vitamin A, vitamin C, calcium, and iron based on a
reference caloric intake of 2,000 calories.144
The regulations standardize the presentation of nutritional information.
It must be set off in a box and printed in one color on a white or neutral
background. The box must display the identifying heading "Nutrition Facts"
in large type, followed immediately by serving size, servings per container,
and calories per serving. The box must contain two columns, one listing the
141. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q); Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (1993); 21 C.F.R. §
101.12 (1993) (listing major product categories and reference amounts customarily consumed per eating
occasion).
142. Nutrition Information of Package Form Food, 21 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1993).
143. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (1993).
144. Id.
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nutrient and quantitative weight in grams or milligrams, and the other
displaying the equivalent percentage of the required daily value. A footnote
must contain the statement: "Percent Daily Values are based on a 2,000 calorie
diet. Your daily values may be higher or lower depending on your calorie
needs. ""' Nutrition information may appear "as purchased" and "as
prepared" on the same item of food with slight modifications to the standard
label.' 46 Simplified labels may suffice on food products containing
insignificant amounts of at least seven of the required nutritional elements.'47
The regulations themselves provide sample labels as well as FDA-
recommended graphic specifications, including different Helvetica typeface
point sizes for different parts of the label and offsets for the box borders.
148
Several important lessons for the discussion of health plan report cards
emerge from study of the NLEA. The first and most encouraging lesson is that
it appears that this type of information disclosure, supported by a public
education campaign about healthy dietary habits, can raise consumer
consciousness about the nutritional content of the foods they consume. How
consumers act on that information is less clear. In other words, we have little
data about the ways in which consumer dietary habits are modified by the new
information they possess. Whether Americans will eat better, now that many
know what the food contains, is a major focus of public health research.
Past experience with product warning labels and other educational
campaigns provides reason to use caution when predicting success. In a
widespread government education campaign about seat belt use in the early
1980s, people understood that seat belts reduced car accident fatalities, but
actual seat belt use increased negligibly from 11.3% to 13.9%. "' Consumers
may respond to information in even more unpredictable ways. A California
State law requiring cancer warning labels on certain products may have caused
consumers to think that certain products were more dangerous than they
actually were.' 50
The second lesson is that information disclosure about nutritional content
is relevant only to a sub-population of consumers;'. the overall effect on
145. Id. § 101.9(d).
146. Id. § 101.9(e).
147. Id. § 101.9(0.
148. Examples of Graphic Enhancements Used by the FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 101 app. B (1993).
149. Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an
Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, I YALE J. ON REG. 159, 176 (1984).
150. See W. KiP Viscusi, PRODUCT-RISK LABELING: A FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY 11-16, 65-69
(1993); W. Kip Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 283 (1988) (discussing the impact of California's Proposition Sixty-Five).
151. One study of the effects of saccharin warning labels found that use of soft drinks containing
saccharin declined in some populations, but remained unchanged in others, particularly the elderly. See
R.E. Schucker et al., The Impact of the Saccharin Warning Label on Sales of Diet Soft Drinks in
Supermarkets, 2 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 46, 46-56 (1983).
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population-wide dietary behavior is unclear. As commentators on the
information overload controversy have noted, consumer motivation to engage
in time intensive searches varies. One can conclude that the NLEA has no
impact on unmotivated consumers, except to the extent that food producers
have improved the nutritional content of their products to avoid revealing
embarrassing unhealthy attributes of their products. There clearly remains a
significant market for less healthy foods, and information disclosure may
simply have created an additional niche market for "lite" and "reduced" foods.
The structure of the health care market may spread the benefits of quality
searching more broadly than the food market does for nutritional information.
The vigilance of some consumers who extensively research quality among
plans may raise the level of quality for all consumers. However, this
conclusion is not automatic. If, for example, further research into consumer
point of insurance decision-making coiifirms that price and waiting time for
appointments overwhelm more subtle quality indicators, then low quality plans
can still flourish as long as they meet the yardsticks that are important to
consumers.
The third lesson is that information disclosure strategies like the NLEA
are expensive. From the government's side, translation of the statutory
provisions of the NLEA into FDA regulations has been described as one of
the most "resource-intensive," meaning expensive, efforts in FDA history.' 52
The costs to industry are even more significant. Compliance entails testing of
food lots, altering package production lines, and cooperating with regulatory
inspections. The government estimated that the new labeling rules will cost
industry $1.7 billion over twenty years. Industry leaders claimed that the first
year costs alone would exceed $2 billion.'53 Most of these costs are passed
on to consumers.
The final lesson is that the length and specificity of the statutory and
regulatory scheme for nutrition labeling, an area in which well established
methods of measurement exist, imply that an even greater level of statutory
and regulatory complexity will emerge in the case of health care report cards,
an area in which well established methods of quality measurement have yet
to be developed. In crafting and implementing the NLEA, both Congress and
the FDA could rely on the scientifically verifiable relevance of measurable data
to good nutrition. We can measure what goes into food, and at this stage in
the development of nutritional science, we know that certain inputs like fat,
protein, sodium, and vitamins have direct links to nutritional outcomes."5
152. Fred R. Shank, The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
247 (1992) (author is Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition of FDA).
153. Nancy Ryan & Linda M. Harrington, FDA Offers New Rules on Food Labels, Claims, CHI.
TRm., Nov. 7, 1991, at C2.
154. See Shank, supra note 152, at 247-49 (describing advancement of nutritional sciences in
post-World War I era). The relationship between nutrition and health is still not fully understood. For
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Achieving this knowledge is a necessary first step, before we consider how
consumers will act upon provision of information. Part II described how
dauntingly large that necessary first step is in the case of health care quality
measurement.
D. Truth In Lending
The story of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is also instructive for the
health care report card effort. Enacted in 1968 as Title 1 of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act,' 55 TILA required all sources of consumer credit to
disclose the annual percentage rate (APR) and the dollar finance charges for
any credit transaction. Before the Act, lenders could quote interest rates in any
non-deceptive format, and many in fact used different formulas to calculate
rates. Since consumers could not compare different loans, Congress feared that
people borrowed at rates that were higher than predicted for a competitive
market for lending.5 6 The avowed purpose of TILA was to "assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to
compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and
unfair credit billing and credit card practices."157
Congress anticipated that standardized disclosure of credit terms would
substantially modify consumer behavior in two fundamental ways. First,
standardization would encourage consumers to credit shop-comparison shop
for credit based on the price of that credit. Credit shopping, in turn, would
increase competition among credit sources to attract well informed consumers.
Second, disclosure of the real costs of credit would encourage consumers to
use credit wisely by opting for cheaper cash payments or by postponing
expensive purchases.'
Like the NLEA, but in marked contrast to the Health Security Act, TILA
includes a fairly precise description of the information required to be disclosed.
Section 1605 sets out an inclusive definition of the finance charge as "the sum
of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit
is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident
to the extension of credit." The finance charge includes the interest; time price
example, the FDA has not established RDVs for many trace mineral elements because their importance
is not yet understood. See Beales et al., supra note 48, at 525.
155. 15 U.S.C § 1601 (1993).
156. See Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale,
64 MICH. L. REv. 1285, 1293-4 (1966).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1993).
158. See George S. Day & William K. Brandt, Consumer Research and the Evaluation of
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differential; any amount payable under a point or discount charge, service or
carrying charge, loan fee, or finder's fee; and premium for default
insurance.'59 Although the Federal Reserve Board may prescribe methods
of calculation, section 1606 specifies that the annual percentage rate (APR)
must yield:
a sum equal to the amount of the finance charge when it is applied
to the unpaid balances of the amount financed, calculated according
to the actuarial method of allocating payments made on a debt
between. the amount financed and the amount of the finance charge,
pursuant to which a payment is applied first to the accumulated
finance charge and the balance is applied to the unpaid amount
financed. 160
The statute establishes special rules for open-end consumer credit plans,
such as credit card arrangements. Section 1602 defines an open-end credit plan
as one under which "the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated
transactions . . . and which provides for a finance charge which may be
computed from time to time on the outstanding unpaid balance. " 161 The
creditor must disclose the conditions under which a finance charge will be
imposed, the method of determining the balance upon which a finance charge
will be imposed, the method of determining the finance charge itself, including
a description of the nominal APR, a description of any other charges, and an
explanation of security interests taken.
61
The statute also describes the content and format of information disclosure
in closed-end and open-end credit card applications; the timing of this
disclosure requirement more closely resembles the point of insurance
information disclosure proposed for the health plan report cards. Solicitations
to acquire open-end credit must include, in tabular format, the APR and
specific disclosure if it is subject to a variable rate, annual or other fixed fees;
the length of the grace period during which no finance charge is applied; and
the name or explanation of the balance calculation method used to determine
the balance upon which the finance charge, the cash advance fee, late fee, and
over the limit fee are applied.163 Disclosure of terms for closed-end credit
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1993).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(1)(A) (1993). Regulation Z describes the APR as "the measure of the
cost of credit, expressed as a yearly rate, that relates the amount and timing of value received by the
consumer to the amount and timing of payments made." Appendix J to Regulation Z provides equations
for calculating the APR. Regulation Z, Determination of Annual Percentage Rate, 12 C.F.R. § 226.22,
app. J (1993).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1993).
162. Id. § 1637.
163. Id. § 1637(c).
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secured by a consumer's principal dwelling requires even more extensive
disclosure. '
Initial reaction to TILA disclosures was mixed. The initial debate
concerned the quantity of information disclosed under the statute. Critics of
the original Truth In Lending Act charged that Truth in Lending disclosures
overwhelmed consumers with too much complicated information and ultimately
discouraged them from credit shopping.' 65 This argument embodied the
concept of information overload. In describing how disclosure under the old
TILA had gotten "out of control," one author cites the lengthy and nearly
incomprehensible disclosure of debt acceleration and default charges."
Studies demonstrated that simplification of the disclosure terms increased
understanding among consumers.'67
The Senate began to consider TILA reform in 1977. The Senate Banking
Committee heard testimony from members of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors and expert opinion suggesting that existing TILA disclosure
overwhelmed consumers by causing information overload. Information
overload criticism eventually became a motivating force behind reform. 6 '
Congress responded in 1980 by enacting the Truth In Lending Simplification
and Reform Act (TILSRA), which eliminated some disclosures and simplified
others. 69 Several changes made under TILSRA include reduced description
164. Id. § 1637a.
165. Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical
Look at the Simphfication of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REv. 841, 843-56 (1977) (using
overload analysis to criticize TILA disclosures and arguing for simplification); Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The
Impact of Truth-In-Lending Disclosures on Consumer Market Behavior. A
Critique of the Critics of Truth-In-Lending Law, 9 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 117, 128-132 (1984)
(summarizing overload studies in TILA and noting that age, race, formal education, income, and credit
experience correlate with overloading); Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A Functional Analysis
of Truth In Lending, 26 UCLA L. REv. 711, 721-34 (1979) (disclosure statement meaningless for
average consumer); Jonathan M. Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 ILL. L.J. 669,
677 (1977) (intricacies of statute and Regulation Z prevent consumers from knowing whether they have
TILA claim in credit transaction disputes).
166. Joseph K. Heselton et al., Truth In Lending Disclosure in Open and Closed End Credit, 9
OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 17, 38 (1984).
167. See Davis, supra note 165, at 869.
168. Simplify and Reform the Truth in Lending Act: Hearings on S. 3212, S. 1501, & S. 1653
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
95th Cong., I st Sess. 7-12 (1977) (statements of Phillip C. Jackson on behalf of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and testimony of Dr. Steven Permut of Yale University School of
Organization and Management); Simplification of the Truth in Lending Act Oversight Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 369-70 (1978); Report of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. REP.
No. 96-73, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (concluding that TIRA disclosure statements were ineffective
communication devices because they were lengthy, legalistic, and disorganized).
169. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168,
168-85 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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of security interests,17 nondisclosure of several types of fixed fees, 7' and
elimination of the use of required terminology.'72
Congress provides the Federal Reserve Board authority to prescribe any
regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of TILA; creditors and lessors
are statutorily obligated to comply.'73 The statute also requires the Board to
publish model disclosure forms and clauses for common transactions. 74 The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the enforcement agency for violations.
Regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board augment the
specificity of the statutory provisions of TILA. The implementing regulation
is commonly called Regulation Z.' 75 The most visible consumer directed
products of the TILA and TILSRA regulations are the "federal box" and the
model forms. The federal box presents disclosure in a standardized format of
limited terms that are presumably significant for the typical consumer shopping
for a loan.'76 It must be set aside from other information so as to be in a
conspicuous and prominent location through dividing lines or offsetting color
backgrounds. The terms "annual percentage rate" and "finance charge" must
be displayed more conspicuously than other terms.'77 The box must also
identify the creditor, the amount financed using plain English descriptions, the
manner of computing the APR, any finance charge with a description of some
excluded charges, circumstances under which the APR may increase,
limitations on that increase, an example of the effects of an increase, the
number and timing of payments, total payments, any prepayment penalties,
late payment charges, and security interests taken.' 78
In order to prevent information overload within the box, only specifically
required and directly related information may appear. Other terms may be
provided in the body of the credit contract. For example, an itemization of the
elements of the amount financed must be separate from the box.' 79 The
Board provides model disclosure forms in the appendices to Regulation Z.
Even though information overload played a prominent role in the
discussions leading up to TILSRA, some argue that disclosure of credit terms
170. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(m) (1994).
171. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b) (1993).
172. Regulation Z contains only two terminology requirements: "finance charge" and "annual
percentage rate." 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.7(0, () (1993).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1993).
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1631 (1993).
175. Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.30, apps. (1994).
176. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17(a)(1), 226.18 (1994).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (1993); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5(a)(1-2), 226.17 (1994); a
model payment box is required by 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a) (1994).
178. The specific disclosures in the Federal Box and the different terms required in different types
of credit transactions are covered in the extensive regulations of Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17-
226.18 (1994) (closed-end credit); 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a (1994) (credit and charge card applications); 12
C.F.R. § 226.5b (1994) (home equity plans).
179. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17(a)(1)-226.18(c) (1994).
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remains confusing and too complex. One group of commentators connected
to the Federal Reserve Board has noted that the disclosure regarding adjustable
rate mortgages is too extensive and suggests that the lesson of keeping things
simple needs to be relearned.'
The FTC was quick to declare TILA one of the most successful consumer
protection statutes, citing greater consumer awareness of the APR and
increased market share held by low cost lenders.' A Senate report in 1980
concluded that after ten years under TILA, "there is a heightened awareness
among consumers as to the cost of borrowing from various types of lending
institutions.""82 In 1987, the Federal Reserve Board's Annual Percentage
Rate Demonstration Project demonstrated that the dispersion of interest rates
declined in markets in which shopper's guides listing APRs had been
published. 3
Early research did find some improved knowledge of credit rates and
charges, but evidence indicated that the majority of consumers remained
uninformed or misunderstood the APR."' Improved knowledge varied
significantly with past credit experience and economic status of the purchaser.
More importantly, as was the case in nutrition labeling, whether the critical
translation of heightened consumer awareness of the APR and other credit
terms into modified credit purchasing behavior had occurred remained unclear.
Several studies concluded that this heightened consumer awareness had little
effect on credit search and credit purchasing behavior."8 5 One study found
that the choice of a dealer or retailer assumed first priority, and the credit or
cash decision flowed by default from this primary choice; it also noted that
180. Griffith L. Garwood et al., Consumer Disclosure in the 1990s, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 777
(1993) (commenting on Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5b(d)(12)(xi), 226.19(b)(2)(viii) (1994)).
181. FED. TRADE COMM'N, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & EVALUATION, CONSUMER
FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY SESSION 29 (1979). One consumer survey found that the awareness of of
survey respondents about typical credit rates increased from 14.5 % to 54.5 % for closed-end credit and
30.9% to 68.0% for open-end credit between 1969 and 1977. THOMAS A. DURKIN &
GREGORY E. ELLIEHAUSEN, 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY (Fed. Res. Bull. 1978).
182. S. Rep. No. 96-73, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1979).
183. Garwood et al., supra note 180, at 781.
184. ROBERT P. SHAY & MILTON W. SHOBER, CONSUMER AWARENESS OF ANNUAL PERCENTAGE
RATES OF CHARGE IN CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDIT: BEFORE AND AFTER TRUTH IN LENDING
BECAME EFFECTIVE 11 (1973); Day & Brandt, supra note 158, at 31; Lewis Mandell, Consumer
Perception of Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical Test of the Efficacy of the Truth-in-Lending Law,
26 J. FIN. 1143, 1153 (1971) (concluding that consumers were still largely unaware of rate of interest
they were paying).
185. GEORGE S. DAY & WILLIAM K. BRANDT, A STUDY OF CONSUMER CREDIT DECISIONS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION 96 (1972) ("evidence strongly indicates
that disclosure of annual percentage rates (APR) and finance charges did not sharply alter the credit
buying behavior of California consumers"); Day & Brandt, supra note 158, at 30-31 (concluding that
improved knowledge of the APR attributable to TILA "had relatively little effect on credit search and
usage behavior"); George S. Day, Assessing the Effects of Information Disclosure Requirements, J.
MARKETING, Apr. 1976, at 42, 44 (reviewing studies of disclosure requirements and concluding that
there is "much less than full awareness, and even less comprehension of the meaning of the information,
while the behavior effects are usually negligible or nonexistent").
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the timing of credit term disclosure usually occurred after the purchase
decision had been made.I"6
The Federal Reserve Board partly addressed this problem by requiring
early disclosure, at the point of credit shopping rather than at the point of
purchase, for certain types of credit such as credit cards, home equity lines
of credit, and adjustable rate mortgages. I"7
Like nutrition labeling, TILA disclosure also has varying relevance to
different consumer populations. As noted above, past credit experience has a
significant affect on knowledge about APR and finance costs. Some
commentators argue that TILA disclosure is ineffective for the poor. 88
TILA disclosure also reinforces the notion that information strategies can
be expensive. A survey conducted by the American Banking Association
estimated the industry wide, direct, out of pocket compliance costs at over ten
billion dollars in 1992.89 These costs are passed on to consumers in the form
of higher fees, higher borrowing rates, and lower interest rates on deposits.
Critics of TILA note an even more fundamental flaw. Even though APR
disclosure is the centerpiece of TILA, comparison shopping based on the APR
is unhelpful in many common credit situations. For instance, dealer APRs in
automobile financing do not reflect forgone cash payments from the
manufacturer. Also, APRs on open-end home equity lines of credit cannot be
compared with those of closed-end second mortgages because the APRs are
calculated differently.'9" The true cost of open-end credit on credit cards
bears less resemblance to the APR as fixed fees and annual membership
charges have increased. In addition, one critic points out that the standard
formulation of the APR is fundamentally misleading for mortgage borrowers
because they are likely to pay off their loans on something other than the
contractual loan repayment schedule.191
186. Day & Brandt, supra note 158, at 30-31.
187. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.19, 226.5a, 226.5b (1994). ButseeJohnP. Danforth, Who
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E. Lessons from the NLEA and TILA for Report Card Systems
Analysis of the NLEA and TILA statutory disclosure schemes is important
to the report card issue because it illustrates the difficulties of identifying and
measuring relevant factors and determining whether disclosure has achieved
stated policy goals. First, the specificity of the NLEA and TILA statutes is in
stark contrast to the lack of substance in the information disclosure
requirements of the major health care reform plans. In nutrition labeling,
Congress could identify fat, calorie, fiber, and salt content as important
information to the decision to eat healthily. In TILA, Congress could define
the APR and finance charges as important elements of an informed credit
transaction. Congress can do no such thing for health care quality, as part II's
discussion of the state of the art in quality measurement has shown.
Even once that first step of disclosure is achieved, as it has been with
much cost and effort for nutrition information and credit terms, the literature
on cognitive biases and information overload suggests that our understanding
of how consumers respond to such disclosure is incomplete at best. Credit
disclosures may not necessarily perfect credit markets, and nutrition labeling
by itself cannot improve our health. In the case of health care quality,
Congress and a national quality agency cannot yet take that second step,
because we simply do not yet know what kind of data imparts meaningful
information on quality care. Once we do, we must still discover whether
consumers will make point of insurance decisions that reward plans for meeting
important, relevani, quality based benchmarks before we turn over our quality
assurance program to the report cards.
Conclusion
Given the cognitive and state of the art limits on health care quality
measurement, policymakers should consider several basic points in devising
an information disclosure program in health care. First, disclosure alone will
not be a quality assurance mechanism. Plans will strive to meet the established
benchmarks, but we do not yet have a set of benchmarks that completely
represents the delivery of quality care. Consumers may make choices based
on disclosed information, but it seems that quality is not the most persuasive
category of information. If that is the case, a competitive market will not solve
our quality problems for us. Some form of active quality assurance system,
perhaps akin to the Peer Review Organization program in Medicare, should
independently monitor quality. Second, the goals that report cards can
realistically achieve-reinforcing a sense of consumer autonomy, facilitating
consumer satisfaction, and promoting price shopping-might be fulfilled
through a less extensive and less expensive program.
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Policymakers must recognize that health care consumers will selectively
overemphasize, de-emphasize, or ignore different types of information. If
report cards are to serve as quality assurance tools, these policymakers must
also confirm that typically overemphasized data are proven quality proxies.
They must highlight typically de-emphasized data if that information truly
reflects quality care. And they can conceivably reduce the costs of a disclosure
program by eliminating ignored data from the report card, or reducing the
quantity of disclosed data to focus attention on the proven quality proxies.
As a quality assurance program, report card systems currently deserve an
F. The course of study in quality management adopted by policymakers is at
the graduate level, but as students, we are still in elementary school. This is
not to say that data gathering and quality monitoring are unreasonable goals;
they are at the heart of the preservation of aspects of this health care system
that succeed and the reform of those that fail. But we do not yet know what
to put on a report card, nor do we understand how the cognitive limitations
and biases inherent in consumer information processing will shape quality
based decisions.
Rather than mandating an expensive national program to collect and
distribute data without first understanding what that data mean or how they
might be used, policymakers should initially invest a fraction of those resources
into research efforts and demonstration projects. By allowing states, employer
networks, and providers to experiment with different collection and disclosure
formats in the course of these projects, we can discover what it is we want to
measure, what those measurements tell us about quality of care, how and
whether consumers and purchasers tend to react, and whether consumers'
satisficing choices serve as a quality assurance mechanism. Most importantly,
in order to preserve quality health care, policymakers must refrain from
designating the report cards the foundation of quality assurance until there is
evidence that they actually work in practice. The private sector and consumers
should likewise recognize that report card systems are not proven quality
assurance tools. Given the recent proliferation of report card systems, the data
to answer these doubts will become available. We must simply resolve to study
it.
We should view with caution the rise of a private report card industry in
health care. The direct consequence of the prominence of report cards in every
national health care reform proposal has been a frantic rush by numerous
private actors to assume the role of report card authority. With millions of
dollars in public and private quality measurement contracts at stake, the
NCQA, JCAHO, managed care plans, and large corporations, to name just a
few, have joined a high stakes race to produce the definitive report card. All
certainly hope to rationalize quality measurement and management, and for all
parties involved, the financial risks and possible payoffs are staggering.
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If this frenzy generates clear information about what aspects of report
cards work and which do not, then so much the better. But during this rush
to produce the definitive report card, policymakers, quality assurance experts,
and consumers must carefully study what exactly these systems measure, what
relationship these measurements actually have to quality, how consumers
process the data, and whether the processed quality data guide consumer
choices in ways that reward quality care. That analysis must necessarily
precede legislative validation or widespread acceptance of any report card
system as a quality assurance program.
The ultimate lessons for the health care context from case studies of
nutrition labeling and truth in lending laws are twofold. First, disclosing quality
information about health care is significantly more complex, and farther beyond
our current abilities, than computing the APR or listing the percentage of
calories from fat. Second, despite some success at elevating consumer
awareness of nutritional content and credit costs, we still have only a vague
understanding of how consumers process and act on the information
provided.' 92 Cognitive psychologists have shown that we should be cautious
in drawing straightforward cause and effect relationships between disclosure
and behavior that will reliably promote the goals of a statutory scheme. Our
mental processes exhibit systematic biases, and information quantity, quality,
and presentation affect decision-making.
Clearly, we have a long academic road to travel in creating a report card
that will assure quality. We must recognize two stages in that journey: defining
what information is relevant to our goal and understanding how consumers
respond to what is disclosed. Experience with NLEA and TILA demonstrates
that the political and administrative process pays close attention to the first
stage, but social science suggests that we do not fully understand the second
stage, which receives far less attention from policymakers. In choosing what
to disclose, we must begin to explore not only what information is relevant to
health care quality but also what information is meaningful to consumers.
Treating an ailing health care system requires a cautious therapeutic
approach. We should not yet expect too much from, nor spend too much on,
information disclosure in health care. Strategic initial investment in a limited
number of pilot programs to refine quality measurement, similar to that which
is already taking place at several large corporations and in select federal and
state agencies, must be followed by a comprehensive evaluation of the interface
between consumers and disclosed information. We must perform this type of
diagnostic test before we prescribe report cards as the treatment of choice in
health care quality assurance.
192. See generally Beales et al., supra note 48 (describing the general lag between our acceptance
of the goals of disclosing information and our understanding of how consumers respond to what
information they are given).
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